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PBEFACE 
A study of the North Atlantic Alliance is important to Americans 
in that the defense of the United States, and to a large extent the 
free world, depends upon its effectiveness. This thesis is concerned 
with what I consider to be NATO's most significant military and polit-
ical problems which, if not solved to the mutual satisfaction of the 
pact's members, will reduce its usefulness as a medium for mutual 
security as well as for political and economic cooperation. 
My interest in NATO. goes back to 1949-1952, when as a captain 
serving with the American forces in Germany, I experienced at a very 
low level the problems of building a strong defense for Western Europe. 
During the intervening years, I have watched the development of NATO 
with the growing conviction that through this alliance the United States 
can help achieve its foreign policy objectives of peace, security and 
economic well-being. 
My appreciation and thanks are gratefully extended to Dr. Glenn B, 
Hawkins, Head of the Political Science Department, and to Dr. Samuel C. 
Patterson for their critical reading of my thesis and for their many 
helpful suggestions which have been of invaluable assistance to me in 
developing its content and organization. I am also indebted to Dr. Guy 
Donnell and Dr, Robert Walker whose suggestions regarding chapters one 
and two were most helpful, Finally, to Dr. C, A. L. Rich goes my deepest 
gratitude for his encouragement and guidance which have been of the 
greatest help and inspiration over the course of my graduate work. 
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If' the world had not been made so skeptical by the abundance of· 
. , ;Vo /I r µ , · · 
bonf!licts e;p.d ;wars over the past half-century, the.A-Atlantic Treaty- o~t 
ganiza.tion (NATO) 'W'ould be considered a near .miracle~ · Twelve, la.te:r , ·;'.· ., 1 1 • 
fifteen, sovereign nations have remained faithful to a mili,tary and po~ 
litical alliance although their respective interests often have clashed. 
A degree of military cooperation, indeed a fusion of military institutions, 
has been reached such as is possible otherwise only in time of w'a.r, The 
most important aspect of NATO, however, is that it constitutes a bridge 
by which the American people crossed from tnei~ original rejection of 
any permanent alliance to the firm association with the European people 
to whom they are related by a common ancestry and civilization.1 
The above sentiments were expresse~ in an editorial of a leading 
Swiss journal upon the tenth anniversary of NATO and are widely held by 
the non-communist peoples of Western Europe, but they do not reflect 
several serious underlying disagreements which have developed within the 
alliance during the past three years. Unless solutions are found to 
fµndamental problems of military strategy and governmental policy the 
effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance will be threatened seri-
ously. On the other hand satisfactory solutions would appear to require 
important changes in American foreign and defense policies. 
1urs Schwarz, "NATO: Ten Years Old," Swiss Review sf World Affairs, 




As an instrument of United States foreign policy the defensive 
military alliance has been of unprecedented importance since the end 
of World War II.2 In these political agreements through which Americans 
have allied themselves militarily with over forty states, the .motivating . 
. · • force has been· primarily the traditional · on~ . of s~ciirfii. 3 ··This: ~l.;Liance 
bas provided the United States with a rapid increase in military power·at 
less cost than would have to be expended to gain the same strength uni-
laterally. In his first report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 
President Truman presented one of the best statements about the United 
States' need for allies. He said: 
Mutual security is not, a one way street. It costs a small 
fraction of our expenditures for our own military forces. Yet 
it gives us strong allies with military manpower far in excess 
of our own and with an industrial plant vital to the free world. 
It gives us overseas bases for use in the common effort •. It 
gives us sources of raw materials essential not only to our own 
military production but to the normal functioning .of our civil-
ian community. It gives us peopl~ who will be with us instead 
of against us in the years ahead. 
Collective security has provided the United States with a quick 
adjustment in its power relationship with the Soviet Union, while at the 
same time it has provided weak and unstable states a protection against 
revolution, subversion, and aggression from stronger and unfriendly 
states. 
2For development of the policy which represents an historical re-
versal of United States participation in peacetime military alliances, 
see Ralph A. Brann, "The United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization," ( unpubl. M. A. thesis, Oklahoma State University, 1953 ). 
3comments upon the general nature of alliances may be found in 
Lennex A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition 
(New York, 1956), p. 107, and Charles o. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of 
the American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1958), pp. 301-303:-
4"First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program," House 
Document 371, (Washington, 1952), p. 4. 
3 
. '<::.: ·. 
Su~cess:f'ul :1nterna.tional agreements and institutions are those that 
I 
recognize and express underlying realities.5 The effectiveness and dura-
tion of such agreements and institutions depends upon the benefit each 
party receives from its participation. When the identity of interest, 
the reality, that created an agreement such as the North Atlantic Alliance 
is reduced, there is danger that this agreement will become a liability~ 
An :i..llu.stra.tion of the inhibiting effect on the forei$!1 policy of the 
United States that is possible when the objectives of alliance members 
a.re at cross purposes was provided by the Suez crisis of 1956. Throughout 
th~ complex negotiations before the United Nations, and in direct diplomatic 
and international conferences, American policy was at least partially gov-
erned by maintaining a common front with two of our NATO allies; Britain 
and France. 6 
Every alliance must reconcile the requirements of external security 
with those of internal policy. Since it is difficult for allies even 
under pressure to agree completely, ea.ch member must be prepared to make 
concessions in order to hold the alliance together .7 Because ,America holds. 
the preponderance of power within the alliances in which it participates, 
and because alliances have become an·essential meditm1 for establishing 
and .maintaining the important foreign policy objectives of peace, security 
and prosperity, the delicate task of insuring that there is a balance of 
incentives among the alliance members falls upon the United States. 
5nea.n Acheson, "The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pa.ct," Department 
£!. State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (March 27, 1949), p. 385. 
6Lerche, ££• .£!!•, p. 302. 
7For further development of this point see: Robert E. Osgood, "NATO: 
Problems of Security and Collaboration," The American Political Sci,ence 
Review, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), P• 107. -
4 
It is reasonable to assume that the broad purposes of the North 
Atlantic Treaty a.s they a.re expressed in the Preamble, "to safeguard the 
freedom, connnon heritage and civil:i.zation of their peoples; founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual. liberty and the ·rule of law, 118 
still are subscribed to wholeheartedly by the member states. The condi-
t1ons that forced the crea~ion of the North Atlantic Alliance, however, 
have changed considerably over the past eleven yea.rs. Whereas the 
United States formerly enjoyed a. monopoly in atomic weapons., there now 
exists nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. Fram 1945 to 1952, Germany 
was under :military occupation., divided into an eastern zone controlled 
by the Soviet Union and three western zones governed by the United States., 
Great Britain and France in a cooperative effort. Today Germany is still 
divided, but the foreign troops on her soil are there as allies and not 
as occupation forces. Western Europe has, within a few years after World 
War II, developed a high degree of economy in which agricultural and in-
dustrial production a.re at an all time high. These developments have 
already create.d a change in emphasis and a.tti tude by key European members 
of NATO toward policies on which a connnon approach is essential for the 
effective operation of the alliance. 
The major hypothesis of this thesis is predicated upon the propQSi• 
tion that in order for the NATO alliance to be effective, it must be 
· acceptable to its :members. If, therefore, the United States is to eon-
tinue to depend upon NATO for defense, the United States will have to .make 
its foreign policies acceptable to the other .members of the alliance. The v 
purpose of this thesis is to determine if United States policies are 
8Lord Ismay, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO - The First Five Years 
1949-1954 ( The Netherlands, 1954), p. 17. - - · -.. , 
5 
sufficiently adaptable to effectively support its commitments to a security 
system that is heavily based upon the North Atlantic Alliance. The sub-
hypotheses of this thesis are: 
1, The adaptability of NATO for future use is conditioned in 
part by the factors that motivated its establishment in the first place. 
These factors were based upon the necessity to secure Western Europe 
against the dangers of aggression from the Soviet Union, the protection 
of legitimate governments from militant communist national minorities, the 
support of economic recovery and the promotion of cooperation among states 
with similar backgrounds and interests which might eventually lead to mili-
tary, economic and political i:crtegration and union on the part of all or 
some of its members. 
2. The rapid improvements in military technology by the Soviet 
Union have made previous strategical concepts of NATO outmoded. The two 
most important of these concepts are: 
a. The strategy which relies almost exclusively upon 
nuclear weapons for deterrence and for defense. 
b. The exclusive reliance upon the United States and to 
a lesser degree Great Britain's monopoly of nuclear weapons within the 
NATO alliance. 
3. Diverse political forces and interests of member states 
threaten the solidarity of the NATO alliance. The most important of these 
political problems are: 
a. "Disengagement," the reduction and separation of 
military forces in Central Europe which would call for a reunified 
Germany outside the NATO alliance. 
6 
b. Nationalism among NATO members which has made negotiation 
with the Soviet Union less effective as well as detracted from the military 
effort of the alliance. 
4. The North Atlantic Alliance has not proven adaptable to the 
unification of either economic or,:po:ti~ieal institutions. 
Within the body of the thesis that follows sub-hypothesis number one 
is discussed in chapter two, sub-hypothesis two in chapter three and sub-
h;rf)othesis three arrd f::m,r in chapter four. The conclus1oiis-,&Jr~ to-•,· 
.. rvur1d in chapte~. five\ •. 
CHAPTER II 
NATO: OBIGINAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 
Two years after the collapse of Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill 
described Europe as, "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground 
of pestilence and hate. 111 His observations reflected the need for 
economic rehabilitation which had proceeded but little beyond the needs. 
of immediate relief as well as the inability of the Western powers to 
reach an accommodation with the government of the Soviet Unio~. Threat~ 
ene~ with economic insecurity, the danger of Soviet expansion as well 
as the lack of internal stability, the Western democracies faced a 
challenge for survival, This chapter describes ~ow this challenge 
was met in part by the defensive alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 
Redress for the Imbalance of Power 
The North Atlantic Treaty was published in March, 1949 and signed 
in Washington by the seven original negotiators plus representatives of 
five other participating states on April 4, 1949.2 The United States 
1Winston Churchill in a speech at Albert H~l, London, May 14, 1947 
as quoted in, The United States in World Affairs, 1948-49, ed. John R, 
Campbell (New York, 1949 ), p. 30-:- · 
2The original negotiators were: Belgium, Canada, France, Great 
Britain, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United States. Other 
signatories were: Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. Greece 
and Turkey joined the alliance in February, 1952. The Federal Republic 
of Germany became the fi:fteenth member of the alliance in 1954. 
7 
8 
Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 82 to 13 on August 24. This 
action by the United States wa.s positive recognition that its security.· 
and welfare were intimately bound to that of the other North Atlantic 
States. It was also the end of the illusion that the United Nations 
could insure inten:ational peace by itself.3 
Of the tasks that faced those charged with formulating the United 
States' foreign policy during the years 1947 to 1949, the restoration of 
the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States was 
fundamental for international security.4 The North Atlantic Treaty 
reflected three important elements of this security effort: To prevent 
an attack on the United States; to prevent Europe from being conquered 
by force; and to prevent Europe from being conquered by other meane.5· 
The American position with respect to Europe was clarified by the 
end of 1947. By then American policy makers had realized that there 
could be no realistic settlement of the peace as long as Europe wa.s 
not only weak but also the object of struggle between.the United States 
and the Soviet Union.6 The equilibrium of power at which United States 
I 
I 
3"The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty," Department of State 
Publication 3497 General Foreign Policy Series 10 (June, 1949T, p. 3. 
Remarks by His Excellency D. U. Stikker, Minister of Foreign Aff~irs 
for the Netherlands. 
4George C. Marshall, "Statement to House C01Dl1littee of Foreign 
Affairs," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (May 16, 1948 ), pp. 
623-625. - . 
5nean Acheson, 11 Statement on Assignment of Ground Forces of the 
United States to duty in the European Area," Hearings Bef'ore ~ 
Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82nd 0ongress, 
1st sessiqn:-(February 1-28, 195I')";" p. 81. · 
6Department Qf State Bulletin, Vol. 27 (December 28, 1947), 
PP. 1244-1247. - . . 
policy was aiming, however, was not just a matter of greater stability 
and order in individual countries, it was an-equilibritun which would 
prevent Soviet expansion and domination of Europe and Asia.7 
The important relationship of the power and resources of Western 
9 
Europe to the security of the United States has been amply demonstrated 
by the United States' participation in World Wars I and II. In the latter 
conf'lict, one of the basic strategic principles consistently followed 
was that priority would be given to the defeat of Germany.8 Among the 
reasons for this policy was the ~nger inherent in German consolidation 
of European resources.9 
The challenges of Soviet power and resulting American policies 
' served to keep attention focused on Europe after the War. The day the 
text of the Atlantic Treaty was released to the press, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson addressed the American people on the meaning of the 
pact.10 In his speech the Secretary of State emphasized the threat to 
the national security of the United States if a single unfriendly power 
7The United States in World Affairs, 1948-49,ER,• cit., p. 16. 
Balance of power is often used with two meanings. It can mean "equilib-
rium" of power which is the meaning used in this study or it is used to 
mean "preponderance," nnre accurately "imbalance of power." Objectively 
used the term "bale.nee of power" is the application of the fundamental 
law of self preservation. For example, if one state attacks a second 
state, the third state cannot afford to see the second crushed to where 
it becomes threatened itself, It is, therefore, farsighted enough to 
support the second state. When one power grows dangerously strong others 
will combine against it. 
8Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff, Prewar Plans~ Preparations: 
, The.!:!· ~- Army in World~ II (Washington, 1950), pp. 9, 117-119, 
9R. E'rne st Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America 
(New York, 1956), p. 462. 
lO"The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact," Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. 20 (March 27, 1949), p. 385. 
10 
were to control all of Europe. The Uni~ed States, he noted, fought two 
great wars to preserve the independence of Europe so that American in-
dependence would also be preserved. 
Two years later, Secretary of State Acheson gave a more detailed 
statement concerning the importance of a free and friendly Western 
Europe to the United States.11 Speaking to the combined Armed Forces 
and Foreign Relations Connnittees of the United States Senate during the 
discussions over the augmentation of United States' ground forces in 
Europe, he mentioned at length the assets of Western Europe which are 
essential to the control of the seas and to the supply of raw materials 
vital to American industry. Com.paring a Europe that contributes the 
skill, courage and resources of a free people to the common defense with 
a Europe dominated by an aggressor that would force 200,000,000 people 
to bend their energies to the destruction of the United States, Secretary 
Acheson concluded that there were only two alternatives - either Europe 
would be adequately defended, or it would fall under the control of the 
Kremlin and add to the military might of the Soviet Union. 
Hanson Baldwin, Military Editor of the New~ Times, put the 
importance of Europe to the United States in terms of political geog-
raphy. Today's long range and high speed weapons have transformed the 
one-time continental strategic concept of North America so that we 
occupy in terms of strategy roughly the same position that the British 
Isles enjoyed in the 19th Century.12 If the Soviet Union should conquer 
llAcheson, op. cit., p. 81. 
12Hanson W. Baldwin, "Atlantic Pact will Guard Western World from 
Attack From the East," Th$~ York Times, November 7, 1948, p. 8E. 
11 
the nonpcomrnunist states in Europe and Asia, the North .American continent 
would eventually become hopelessly isolated. In this sense, the stra-
tegic purpose of the North Atlantic Pact is to prevent domination of 
Europe and Asia by the same power.13 
In the years immediately after World War II, the monopoly of the 
United States in atomic weapons acted as the major deterrent to the 
Soviet Union's overrunning Western.Europe. Churchill, visiting the 
United States in the spring of·1949, stated that it is certain that 
Europe would have been co~Jnunized like Czechoslovakia, and London would 
have been under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the 
atomic bomb in the hands of tt_.2: United States •14 
An examination of land strength found the West as of 1948 exceed-
ingly weak as opposed to the Soviet Union. One estimate reported that 
the Soviet bloc, as of the fall of 1948, had available 5,200,00C' sol-
diers as opposed to 4,400,000 of anti-communist states which were not 
united and heavily committed in some cases to colonial requirements in 
the Far East.15 Another estimate credits the Soviet Union with having 
4,000,000 under arms.16 An alliance to unite the anti-communist states 
seemed not only possible but also necessary at this time if the United 
States wished to check Soviet expansion. 
In contrast to the Soviet Union which maintained and expanded its 
armed forces after the close of World War II, the United States, according 
l3Ibid., p. 8E. 
14John Foster Dulles, War £E_ Peace (New York, 1950), p. 116. 
l5The New York Times, October 7, 1948, pp. 1, 7. 
16Massimo Salvadori, NATO - A Twentieth Century Community of Nations 
(Princeton, 1957), p. 68.~ 
l2 
to its historic tradition of isolation and with the additional security 
created by possessing a monopoly in atomic armament, rapidly demobilized 
its wartime forces. By 1948, the total military strength of the United 
States was but 11 per cent of that of 1945. British and Canadian dis-
armament was equally severe.17 
The governments of Euxope, however, could not feel secure as long 
as their primary means of defense against attack was the dropping of 
bombs on the Soviet Union by air from the United States. To the Western 
European countries, it was of supreme importance that they be spared an 
invasion and subsequent liberation. French Premier Henri Queuille ex-
pressed this thought by writir.,g: 
We know that once Western Europe was occupied, America 
would again come to our aid and eventually we would again be 
liberated. But the process would be terrible. Tbe next time 
you probably would be liberating a corpse 18 
The importance of defending Europe on the continent rather than of 
liberating her was also recognized by the United States. This realiza-
tion was especially important if any resistance to Soviet aggression was 
expected on the part of the non-connnunist European states.19 A blunt 
appraisal of this fact by General Omar Bradley, Chief of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, went further in pointing out the necessity of holding 
perimeter bases for military expediency, and also for the frank reason 
that if a war has to be fought, it is much better to have to fight it 
in some other part of the world.20 
l7Ibid., p. 68. 
18The New~ Times, March 3, 1949, P• 5. 
19 11The United States Military Assistance Program," Department£! 
State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (May 22, 1949), p. 645. 
20Acheson, op. cit., p. 127. 
13 
One of the purposes of the North Atlantic Pact is to act as a 
deterrent. This view was shared not only by American officials, but by 
those of the other participants as well. Secretary of State Acheson, 
in a statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations which was consid-
ering the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, replied to a question 
by the Corrnnittee Chairman, Senator Connally, regarding the deterrent 
effect of the treaty. He said, "that is the dominant and overwhelming 
purpose of this treaty." He also added that it would have a deterrent 
effect on the practice of' one nation reaching out and grabbing little 
nations one at a time, incorporating them into its system. 21 
This thought was voiced in a report of the Foreign Relations 
Committee in its hearings on the Vandenberg Resolution (Senate Resolu-
tion 239) in 1948. "The Committee is convinced," the report said, 
"that the horrors of another world war can be avoided only with cer-
tainty by preventing war from starting, The experience of World Wars 
I and II suggests that the best deterrent to aggression is the certainty 
that immediate and effective counter-measures will be taken agains1 
those who violate the peace. 1122 President Truman was also in agreement 
and stated in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, "If we can make 
it suf'ficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our 
national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack 
might never occur. 1123 
2111The North Atlantic Treaty," Hearings Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations,~ l, 81st Congress, 1st sessi'o'rt(April 27, 1949), j;i":- 20. 
22Report of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Senate Resolution 
239, 80th Congress, 2nd session. 
23Harry S. Truman, "The Inaugural Address,"!:::_ New Era in World 
Politics - Selected Speeches and Statements of President Truman, January 20 
to August 29, 1949 ( January 2o,""1949), p. 6 .- · 
14 
The hope that a clear statement of the United States' position in 
regard to further Soviet expansion in Europe might help prevent a war 
breaking out inadvertently was also voiced by British Foreign Secretary 
Bevin at the debate in the House of Commons over the North Atlantic 
Treaty on May 12, 1949. When the accusation was made that the Atlantic 
Pact is aggressive and will result in war, Foreign Secretary Bevin re-
plied that the absence of the Atlantic Pact did.not prevent war in 
either 1914 or 1939. Re added that if the potential aggressors had 
known what the results of their aggression would be, these wars might 
have been avoided. The real purpose of the Atlantic Pact, he remarked, 
is to act as a deterrent. 24 
Cement for Economic Recovery 
Confidence in the expectation of peace is most necessary to economic 
recovery. The North Atlantic Pact helped provide the Western European 
governments with security beyond their individual means of attainment 
without reduction in their alree,dy marginal standards of living. 
The Europe of July, 1945, was physically devastated. Both agricul-
tural and industrial production was seriously impaired. The United 
States, as one great power whose economy had not been seriously dislocated 
by the war, gave almost immediate assistance to the weary states. Through 
contributing the largest share to the United Nations Relief and Rehabili-
tation Administration (UNRRA) which was to assist in providing the ne-
cessities for domestic consumption, and through loans to individual 
24 11Parliamentary Debates" (Hansard), House of Commons Official 
Rep9rt 5th Session of the Thirty-eighth Parliament of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain ana:-Northern Ireland, Vol. 464, 5til""Series, cols. 2010-
2015. 
countries to permit the purchase of goods essential to return their 
economies to working order, the United States hoped to assist many 
Western European governments in averting serious economic, social and 
political upheavai. 25 But, by 1947, it became apparent that American 
loans to individual countries were not having the desired effect. The 
country-to-country approach appeared to have led to the dissipation of 
available resources in meeting a series of individual crises without 
getting at the roots of the problem. 26 Complicating recovery efforts 
15 
was the breakdown in wartime cooperation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The policies of the Soviet government and of the 
Communist parties outside the Scrv-iet Union opposed and obstructed 
efforts to bring about a general recovery. 27 
In his historic commencement address at Harvard in June, 1947, 
Secretary of State :Marshall proposed a better organized plan for 
European recovery based upon European cooperation wherein the individual 
states accepted joint responsibility for the solution and execution of 
an. aid program that would be furnished by the United States. 28 The 
purpose of combatting "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos," as 
General Marshall had put it at Harvard, undoubtedly expressed the desires 
25M, Margaret Ball, NATO and~ European Union Movement (New York, 
1959), PP, 3-4. 
26Ibid., p. 6. 
27George C. Marshall, "Introduction," The United States and World 
Affairs, 1948-49 (New York, 1949 ), p. vii.- -- -
28 11A Program for United States Aid to European Recovery," Assistance 
to European Economic Recovery. Department of State Publication 3022 
Economic Cooperation Series g (February, 191i'.'8), Annex pp. 10-11.~ 
of the .American people for the Foreign Assistance Act which laid the 
basis for the .American obligation of the European Recovery Program was 
passed by Congress on April 3, 1948.29 
It was the national interest of security, however, rather than 
sentiment that dictated the unprecedented Marshall Plan for European 
recovery, President Truman expressed the point of view that sound 
16 
economic recovery and adequate military defense must be carried forward 
together and balance. If the fear of military aggression is widespread, 
the President said, economic recovery will lag due to lack of investment 
and new industry.30 
The Marshall Plan had been America's way of recognizing that it 
was in the interest of the United States to encourage, guide and sup-
port Europe's recovery effort. The North Atlantic Treaty constituted 
the American answer to the parallel problem of military security. 
h 
Within the text of the Treaty, the importance of a healty economy as 
/\ 
well as economic cooperation and collaboration by members of the pact 
is significantly emphasized in Article 2.31 
Force for Political Stability 
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Pact provides a stabilizing force 
to participating governn1ents, threatened by sabotage of their parlia-
mentary institutions, economic chaos through political strikes, civil 
29Ibid., pp, 2-3, 
30H o T _ arry . ruman, 
Foreign Wars at Miami, 
Politics, pp. 43-11.6. 
11An Ad.dress Before the Convention of Veterans of 
Florida, August 22, 19~-9," !:::_ New Era £! World 
31North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2. For text of the treaty see, 
Lord Ismay, NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954 (The Netherlands, 
1954), PP• 17-19, - --
wars and guerrilla activities at the hands of the national communist 
minority groups. Under provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty, the 
member states are obliged to consult together when, in the opinion of 
any member, "the territorial integrity, political independence or 
security of any of' the parties j s threatened. 11 32 The effect of 
Article 4 is to provide a means for the legal government of a party 
to the Atlantic Pact to request assistance from other members in 
order to maintain it,;;elf in power. Whether or not assistance would 
be forthcoming ,rouJ.d depend upon the circumstances involved, ul ti-
mately upon the interests of the NATO governments. 
The flexibility of the >'::>:th Atlantic Pact to deal with threats 
by internal subversion as opposed to a direct armed attack of aggres-
17 
sion was brought out during the hearings on the treaty by the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. In an exchange between 
Senator Fulbright and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, was asked: 
Would an internal revolution, perhaps aided and abetted by an 
outside state, in which armed force was being used in an attempt 
to drive the recognized government from power, be deemed an 
'armed attack' within the meaning of article 5?33 
In his reply to Fulbright's question, Dean Acheson replied that he 
considered the revolution an 11 armed attack, n but he felt that each 
country would have to determine this fact for itself,34 
The dangers of indirect aggression were, to many, more real and 
important than that of outright Soviet attack which would involve too 
32Ibid., Article 4, 
33Ibid., Article 5. 
3411North Atlantic Treaty," Hearings Before the·senate Connnittee on 
Foreign Relations, Part I, 81st Congress, 1st Session (April 27, 1949;, 
PP• 56-59, -- -
many risks. Among the people supporting this position were the late 
Secretery of State) J"ohn Foster Dulles, and career diplomats, George 
F , KennPn and Charles E, Bohlen, This position was supported by many 
Europeans who felt that the primary danger was non-overt in nature and 
that emphasis should be placed on the political, economic and psycho-
logical aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty.35 
'1\1e So·Jiet UnJ.onJ aided by nat:i.onal Conmnmist groups that }::113,cI 
gained strength and ·11r:::st1ge because of its resistance to the Axis 
pm1ern., exerted. pre::;nur0 ,.'n non-communist countries, partici.:u.a,rly 
throughout Europe, the middle East and Far l~ast as early as 194~--45. 
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In the states overrun by tbs ·~-,:i.et armies, representative institutionr;i 
became meaningless or were destroyed. Elsewhere, there was civil war 
and guerrilla activity such as in Greece, China, Burma, the Philippines, 
Vietnam and. Malaya. Tu.1t;:ey and Iran were subject to threats of aggres-
sion. In Indonesia there were several attempted coups d'etat 
later, in Czechoslovakia, a successful coup d'etat. In Italy the Com~ 
munists possessed large stores of arms against the day when they would 
seize power.36 
During the winter of 1947-!i-8, there was fear of indirect aggression 
in Western Europe. The Communist parties in F'rance and Italy were openly 
violent in protest over the proposed Marshall Plan. All vestiges of 
postwar collaboration between the communists and the government were over, 
35Ra:vmond Aron and August Heckscher, Diversity of the ~.9: (New 
York, 1957), pp. 22-24. 
36salvadori, op, cit., pp. 68-74. 
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In France, transportation and utilities workers struck. Three divisions 
of French troops were required to restore order in the coal fields.37 
Internationally, the Communist party clearly established its pri-
mary loyalty to the Soviet Union in a series of statements that were 
tantamount to an open declaration of treason.38 The Communists boasted 
openly that the Red armies were soon to come, thus gaining additional 
followers through fear and the promise that members would be safe from 
punitive action when the Soviet Union did take over.39 Reaction and 
resistance to Communist pressures increased as the objectives of the 
Soviet Union and the national Conrrnunist parties became more widely 
recognized. Because of the ccrility of the non-communist states out-
side of the Western Hemisphere, an increasing share of the burden of 
resistance to communism fell upon the United States. 
After the objectives of the Soviet Union and national communist 
parties were known, several pre-NATO pacts were initiated to combat 
world-wide communism. The first of these concerned the government 
of Greece. Since 1944, the British had been supporting the legitimate 
government of Greece; but in 1947 they were forced to notify the United 
States that they no longer could carry this responsibility. As a 
result, the Truman Doctrine was formulated and submitted to the Congress 
in March, 1947. Under the Truman Doctrine, military and economic as-
sistance was given Greece and Turkey to help these countries maintain 
37David Schoenbrun, As France Goes (New York, 1957), pp. 84-90. 
3Sibid., p. 87. 
39Dulles, op. cit., pp, 84-90. 
their free institutions against both indirect and direct aggression 
which, if successful, would ultimately undermine international peace 
and the security of the United States.40 
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In ¥iarch, 1948, a year after the Truman Doctrine was submitted to 
Congress, the Brussels Treaty, the antecedent to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. It pledged these states to set up a joint defensive 
system as well as to strengthen their cultural and economic ties.41 The 
Brussels Treaty attempted to deal with the problem of internal subver-
sion by agreeing to cooperate in raising living standards and bringing 
to the people a greater ux1der-.<;r ".!ding of the principles of their common 
civilization. 1+2 
To furtJ2er solidify the security of the North Atlantic countries, 
the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified. This treaty, like the Brussels 
Pact, is an attempt to attain security through economic means as well 
as promoting greater understanding of the ·principles upon which the 
institutions of the member governments were established. 43 
The initial effects of the North Atlantic Pact were felt primarily 
against indirect, internal aggression. Negotiations with Soviet leaders 
over Berlin moved rapidly to settlement after the North Atlantic Pact 
~-O:a:arry S. Truman, "Recommendation f'or Assistance to Greece and 
Turkey," House Document 171, 80th Congress., 1st session (March 12., 
1947L PP· 1-5, -
41 rsmay., op. cit., p. 8. 
42The Brussels Treaty, Articles 2 and 3, For text of the treaty 
see, Salvadori, op. cit., pp. 165-167. 
43North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2. Ismay, op.~., p. 17. 
was concluded. This was contrary to the expectations of many of the 
pact's critics who had expected negotiations with the Russians to 
4L~ 
become more difficult, 
Approach to Unitl 
The comn1u..rdty of interests that resulted in the North Atlantic 
Treaty thus far discussed have been directly concerned with furthering 
the national interests of security and economic well-being of the par-
ticipating states. To ~nany people, there was an even more important 
ideological reason for participation in the ·pact - that of promoting 
unity through the process of military; economic and eventually po-
litical federation. Many of the ardent advocates of world federation 
were hopeful that the North Atlantic 'Ireaty contained the germ of 
federalism. The Atlantic Union Committee, with Justice Owen J. 
Robert as president and Clarence Streit, leader of the campaign for 
"Union Now," on the board of directors, was organized to press this 
point of view on Congress.45 
The ultimate success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) rests in the people's understanding of the concepts of the 
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freedom of thought and being in an open and free society. The military 
organization of NATO can fulfill its function in the long run only if 
it is regarded as the starting point for closer cultural and social 
cooperation of the countries in the North Atlantic connnunity and not 
l+4see statements of private witnesses before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate in consideration of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, 81st Congress, 1st Session (May 4-18, 1949). 
l~5Marquis W. Childs, "Washington and the Atlantic Pact," ~ Yale 
Review, Vol. 38 (June, 1949), pp. 583-584. 
as a goal in itself. 46 The idea that the nations that are a party to 
the North Atlantic Treaty share a common culture is a popular concept 
frequently expressed. One of the principal views is that Western 
culture is strongly identified with liberty, the dign~ty of the indi-
vidual and individual responsibility. 47 Lester B. Pearson, Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, said upon the occasion of 
the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty: 
We are strong in our lands and in our resources, in 
industry and manp01,~"r, We are strong above all in our 
common tradition of liberty, in our connnon belief in the 
dignity of the individual, in our common heritage of social 
and political thoUff.gt and in oux resolves to defend these 
freedoms together. 1-
The idea of unity of states, world g0vernment and regional 
federation has come up frequently since 1939. In that year Clarence 
K. Streit, in a widely published book, proposed a union of the At-
lantic democracies which in turn would provide a nucleus for world 
government.49 The common bond between the .American and the European 
is expressed by Mr, Streit when he indicated that: 
In the democracies of Europe - in the little democracies -
in the danger zones; in the more fortunate democracies of 
Scandinavia; above all, in the great democracies of France and 
46Salvadori, op. cit., pp. 137-38. 
47Ibid., p, 12, 
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48 11The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty," Department of State 
Publication 3497, General Foreign Policy Series 10 (June, 194'§1", p. 10, 
49c1arence K. Streit, Union Now (New York, 1940), 15 ed. The 
union which Streit proposed would provide for a corrrrnon defense, 
citizenship, customs free economY,money and postal communications 
system for the founder democracies comprising the .American Union, 
the British Commonwealth, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Con-
federation, Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
Britain - the average American finds a way of life which he 
knows instinctively to be the way of life which he himself 
has chosen.50 
Again, in January, 1941, there was a cry for unity. Wendell L. 
Willkie, while still titular head of the Republican party, publicly 
advocated what he called an "economic and social 11 1.mion of the United 
States and British Commonwealth. Winston Churchill, in the dark hours 
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of the French defeat, proposed "an indissoluble w"l.ion of our two peoples. n 
The offer was sincere and acclaimed by the British people.51 After 
World War II, Churchill E,gain proposed a fraternal association between 
the United States and the British Commonwealth in the form of a military 
alliance.52 
While the framers of the Ncrth Atlantic Treaty were careful to 
avoid implicction that one of the purpo·ses of the pact was to lead to 
world federation,53 the hope that some degree of integration of military, 
political and economic institutions would result from participation in 
the alliance was a strong motivating force in favor of the pact. 
The North Atlantic Treaty was born out of collective insecurity 
caused in part by the imbalance of power that developed when the Western 
democracies disarmed after World War II while the military forces of the 
Soviet Union were kept mobilized on a war time footing. The pact was 
created to bring not only security from external aggression, but to 
stabilize political institutions threatened by the internal subversion 
5o 11A Way of Life, 11 The New York Times, June 15, 1938, p. 22, as 
quoted in StreitJ op. cit., P:-3~ 
51George Catlin, The Atlantic Community (Wakefield, England, 1959 ), 
PP• 2-3, 
52salvadori, op. cit., pp. 150-153, 
53Childs, 912· cit., p. 584. 
of a militant com.mur;.ic:,t mi.nority. While nations and people were insecure 
efforts to effect economic recovery were stifled. These conditions were 
Nil.TO 1· :s heritage and. it is against this backgr01.md that the future of the 
North Atlantic .All:i.ance will, in part, be determined, 
... j. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MILITARY ISSUES 
The greatest difficulties faced by the North Atlantic Alliance are 
those concerned with the problems of military strategy and the impact of 
these problems upon the national interests of the member states.1 The 
difficulty in developing a military strategy that will serve equally the 
defensive needs both of the European and American members of NATO has 
been greatly complicated by the rapid gain in the military technology 
of the Soviet Union. 
The strategy of NATO has been primarily an "all or nothing" concept 
based upon the superiority of United States_' nuclear weapons to deter 
aggression through the threat of "massive retaliation." Since 1955 
when the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear device, the 
strain upon the members of NATO has intensified with the increased 
realization that joint military action is likely to subject Western 
Europe to Soviet nuclear attack. As a result there is a demand within 
NATO for a strategy which will allow an alternative to total war. 
It is not possible, however, to wish away the existence of nuclear 
weapons. It is only by having an effective nuclear deterrent that an 
alternative strategy may be considered. The reluctance of the United 
States, however, to share its nuclear capability with the other members 
1For an excellent analysis of the NATO security problem see, Robert 
E. Osgood, "~ATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration," The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), pp. 106-129-:--
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of the alliance has created doubt within NATO that the United States 
will use nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. As a 
result of this doubt there is a demand for nuclear sharing within the 
alliance. 
The future effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance depends to 
a l~rge degree upon agreement over military strategy. The burden, 
however, of developing a military strategy acceptable to all members of 
NATO depends upon the United States since it occupies the ~ominant 
position within the alliance. 
!a! Dilemma .2f ~ Strategy 
The United States and its allies are f aced with two distinctive 
military problems. The first is to deter the Soviet Union from resortin~ 
to general atomic war; the second is to prevent the Soviet bloc from 
expanding its influence through the conduct of limited military, o~ 
quasi-military aggression against any areas of the non-connnunist world. 
The two iroblems are related and are interdependent, but are not one and 
the same and cannot be met effectively by the same means. One requires 
~ ~1Jhly effective nuclear striking force. The other requires mo'bil.t 
t1re brigades able to use either conventional (non.nuclear) weapon5, o~ 
so oalled tactical atomic weapons. 2 
The strategy of NATO has been based primarily upon the supposition 
that Soviet aggression would come in the form of some clear cut violation 
ot same Yell-established boundary against which the NATO forces could 
react with nuclear weapons used tactically, or strategically, or botn. 
2Townsend Hoopes, "Overseas Bases in .American Strategy," Foreigp 
A!tairs, Vol. 37 (October, 1958), PP• 78-79. 
Yet Soviet military violence in Europe has been limited to suppressing 
uprisings in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956, neither of 
which lent themselves to basic NATO strategy. As long as the West's 
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nuclear capabi lity continues to match that of the Soviet Union the type 
of conflict in which NATO is most likely to become involved is apt to 
arise over some issue, such as the Berlin controversy, where the use of 
nuclear weapons i s not appropriate.3 
The dilennna t hat faces NATO concerns how the alliance should react 
to limited aggression. The first alternative is to rely on massive 
strategic retailiation, or capitulation.4 The second alternative is to 
retaliate by using tactical nucl ear weapons to compensate for numerically 
inferior forces while making an effort to limit the conflict to a local 
area. The t hird alternative is to retaliate by using conventional force 
for as long as the enemy does not utilize nuclear weapons. The second 
and third options together provide for meeting _less-than-ultimate 
threats with less-than-ultimate responses.5 While the third alternative 
has become increasingly attra\ive to the European members of the 
A 
alliance, it is the one which NATO capabilities are least able to 
support. The following analysis will deal with these three strategic 
alternatives. 
3Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959), 
pp. 336-37. 
4NATO Letter, February 1, 1957, pp. 27-30, As will be brought out 
later in this chapter the option to use strategic retaliation rests with 
the United States and Great Britain who possess within their national 
forces the necessary weapons and means of delivery. 
5Loc. cit. 
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The Development £f_ American Military Strategy. The theory of the 
massive strategic air offensive is credited largely to B~igadier General 
Guilio Douhet, an Italian officer who presented his philosophy in 1921 
with the publication of a book entitled, The Command .9!_ the ~.6 The 
broad outline of Douhet's thesis was that ultimate victory could be 
assured only through aggressive aerial bombing. This philosophy found 
ready support in the United States Anny Air Corps, the Royal Air Force 
of Great Britain and the German Air Force in the years prior to the 
outbreak. of World War II. 
The World War II experience with strategic bombing provided a test 
of Douhet' s ideas. The result s were inconclusive, with conflicting 
claims made as to the contribution of strategic bombing to the allied 
victory.7 The revolution in weapons caused by the development of the 
atomic bomb, however, has given the philosophy of Douhet an efficaay 
which bas made the doctrine of the strategic e.ir offens"tve the basis of 
United States and NATO military strategy . 
The emphasis on the atomic bomb in United States' military 
strategy developed soon af'ter its inital use against the Japanese in 
6Guilio Douhet, The Connnand of the Air, tr . Dino Ferrar : (New York, 
.1942). An excellent discussion o~ti:.ie""influence of Douhet is given in 
Brodie , op. cit., pp. 71-106. 
7The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (U.S.S.B.S. ) carried out 
its survey of the effects of United States and British bombing in Europe 
with the object of applying these lessons to the war against Japan. The 
results were published, but they had only limited distribution because 
of security classification. Statistics of the surveys show that German 
production in almost all categories increased between 1942 and 1944, but 
that the bombing prevented even greater possible increases. The effects 
of the bombing were felt the most d1.1,ring the last f ew months of the 
war when allied ground forces _were on the continent in strength and 
victory was assured. "U. S.S.B. S.," The Effects of Strategic Bombing on 
~ Gennany War Economy, (Item 3 for°"iuropean War}, pp . 6-11. ---
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AUgust, 194~. General H. H. Arnold, a member of the American Joint 
Chief& of Staff and Commanding General of the Army A~r Corps during 
World War II, maintained early in 1946 that the United States should 
capitalize on the bomb, if' necessary, to assure world peace.8 Army Air 
Corps General Ira Eaker predicted later in 1946 that the next war would 
be a short one of unparalleled destruction with the first blows struck 
through the air. He argued that the United States should place primary 
reliance upon the long range bomber for securtty.9 This viewpoint soon 
o om inated Western strategy with respect to Europe. 
The reliance upon the United States Strategic Ai+ Command (SAC), 
with its capacity to deliver nuclear weapons was widely credited with 
preventing Soviet aggression in Europe from 1946 to 1956. The European 
members of NATO were induced to make commitments to the alliance only 
upon the promise of the United States that SAC stood ready at all times 
to implement the defense of Europe.10 
The outbreak of war in Korea demonstrated that the deterring effect 
of the atomic bomb was less than had been anticipated. The lesson that 
should have been learned from the Korean fighting regarding the importance 
of well-trained, conventionally armed forces, was ignored, however, by 
America~ leaders with the result that ~uring the months following the 
armistice greater reliance than ever was placed upon strategic bombing 
f .or o.etense and deterrence. 
8Tb~ New York Times, January. 14, 1946, p. 7. ---
9rbid., November 21, 1946, p. 10. 
, 1011Tbe Joint Defense orl Western Europe," Department of State 
Publication 4126 (February, 1951 ),. p. 5. · This publication contains the 
statements otTecretary of State1Adheson, :Secretary ofl Defense Marshall, 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' of Staff Brad.le~ before ·the Senate 
Foreign Relations ·and· .A::rmed Services eommittees-, ,. February !5 and 16, 1951, 
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In 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a widely publicized 
speech described American military strategy using the term "massive 
retaliation." Dulles stated that in the event of aggression the United 
States would depend upon its capacity to retaliate immediately "by· means 
and at places of our own choosing." This would permit the development 
of a military establishment to fit our policy instead of having to meet 
the enemies plans. The policy of "massive retaliation," according to 
Mr. Dulles, would make possible greater security at less cost.11 
The United States has not hesitated to use the threat of massive 
retaliation during periods of international tension. In the Suez crisis 
General Alfred M. Gruenther, then commander of Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe, warned the Soviet Union of the consequences of its 
interference, and a year later Secretary Dulles remarked at a news 
conference that the American response to a Russian attack on Turkey, 
If 1112 would not mean a purely defensive operation. • • The latest 
warning occurred as recently as the spring of 1959 when President 
Eisenhower, in referring to the Soviet threats to alter the status of 
West Berlin through unilateral action, indicated that NATO woul~ not 
fight a ground war in Europe, but might have to fight a nuclear war 
even though it would be so disastrous as to be "self-defeating. 1113 
11The New York Times, January 13, 1954, pp. 1, 3. The policy of 
"massi~retaliation" as expressed by Secretary of State Dulles was 
reiterated in even more forceful terms by Vice President Nixon in 
March, 1954. See, The New York Times, March 14, 1954, pp. 1, 44. 
12 The New York Times, November 14, 1956, pp. 1, 12; - and, October 17, 
1957, PP• i:-9-. -
13Ibid., March 12, 1959, P• 1. 
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Although the United States has maintained the policy of massive 
retaliation as a reaction to limited aggression, it has also accepted an 
alternative policy based on a limited use of nuclear weapons. This 
strategy envisions the use of nuclear weapons in the tactical rather 
than the strategic sense. It infers a limitation as to size, area ot 
employment and nature of target. The use of nuclear weapons tactically 
was made possible by technological developments that has reduced the size 
and destructive capability of these weapons.14 Along with the .new 
development in weapons , changes were made in the American military 
establishment that were designed to tailor the armed forces, particularly 
the army, to the nuclear strategy . 
The armed forces began to be reorganized in late 1953. They were 
given what has been described as a "new look. 1115 The "new look" was 
based upon the superiority of American science and industry and upon 
the reduction of military manpower and expenditure,16 Under the policy 
of the "new look" the total number of American men in uniform was 
reduced from 3,450,000 in December, 1953, to 2,815,000 in 1955.17 The 
14John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States 
Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (October, 1957), p, 31. 
15The term was apparently first used by Secretary of Defense Charles 
E, Wilson in June 1953 while testifying before the Senate Committee on 
appropriations on the 1954 defense appropriations. Wilson promised "a 
new look at the entire defense picture." "Hearings on the Department of' 
Defense appropriation for 1954," S~te Committee on Appropriations, 
83rd Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1953), p. 6. 
16see Charles o. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1958), PP• 4o8-409. ~ ~ 
l7James J. Gavin, ~~Peace in ,2 Space~ (New York, 1958) 
p, 153, Reductions in the armed forces continued until 1959, ln 1954, 
the army contained 20 divisions. The budget of 1959 called tor the 
support of 14 divisions. 
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army suffered the bulk of this reduction. These losses were compensated 
for in part by the increase in fire power due to nuclear weapons which 
b~caxne available to the army for tactical use. 
The doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war has been 
. gerierally accepted by the highe$t 'civilian officials as well aij by 
military officers.18 Perhaps the most important reason for its 
acceptance is that it is cheaper to prepare for and fight limited wars 
with nuclear weapons. As one expert put it, "the dog we lteep to deal 
with the cat will be able to deal with the kittens."19 A second reason 
is that if nuclear weapons are not used by us in the next w~r it might 
prove disastrous. 
The th~rd alternative, that of fighting a limited war with the use 
of conventional weapons has not been accepted as a desirable course of 
action in the event the United States is faced with such a problem, Our 
refusal to interfere in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu was based in part 
on the fact that the job would have required the use of conventional 
forces, since nuclear weapons were not tactically appropriate to that 
situation. 20 
Due in part to an increased realization that there are many situations 
requiring the use of armed forces in which, nuclear weapons are of 
little military value or are impractical for political reasons, and 
in part to an awareness that with the use of nuclear weapons in limited 
18 . d Dulles, .2£• cit., p, 31, One important author who has committe 
himself to the use of nuclear weapons in limited war is, Henry A. 
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), 
l9Air Marshall Sir John Slessor as quoted in Brodie,~·~., p, 331, 
20 Gavin,~· cit., p. 126. 
wars may cause them to de:Velop into total wai·s; there is some evidenc.e 
of an increase of interest in conventional weapons and forces. 21 The 
renewed interest in conventional forces has not, however, yet been 
reflected in any noticeable increases in the size of the armed forces. 
The Deve~ of NATO's Military Strategy. 'I1he strategy of NATO has 
reflected to a considerable degree the military policies of the United 
States. The first important strategic decision that had to be made 
after NATO was formed concerned whether Europe was actually to be 
defended. The answer to this question came quickly. The European 
members of the pact were unequivocal in their decision that Europe was 
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to be defended, not liberated. This was recognized by the United States 
in 1949 and became implicit in NATO policy decisions which were predicated 
upon the defense of all member states.22 As a result of this decision 
the "forward strategy" concept was developed to hold the potential 
enemy as far to the East in Europe as possible. 23 
The "forward strategy" did not receive much implementation until 
the Lisbon meeting of the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers in February, 
21secretary of State Herter in speaking of the Berlin Crisis 
tempered the President's threat of "massive retaliation" by saying that 
the United States would not be justified in conducting nuclear war 
until we were fully convinced that the Russians were carrying out their 
attack to the point of all out war. See, !he New York Times, April 21, 
1959, P• 1. 
22see., "The United States Military Assistance Program," Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (May 22, 1949 ), p. 645. - \ 
23Lord Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years 1949-1954 (The Netherlands, 
1954), p. 102. See also".:'""Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War 
(Evanston, 1957), pp. 161, 168, for West German views on the importance 
of the "forward strategy." 
1952. The military recommendation of this meeting of the Council, 
based in part on the fact that the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) was now in existence as a controlling headquarters, was 
to create a strong defensive shield capable of withstanding the shock 
of aggression until reserve forces could be mobilized. To this end 
priority was given to the rapid establishment of the largest possible 
front line force. 24 
During the remainder of 1952 and 1953 considerable progress was 
made in NATO's military strength. In 1953 it was decided to shift the 
emphasis from increasing the number of divisional type uni-@ to improving 
the combat efficiency of exist;:lng units. To that effect increases in 
strength were to come primarily in "support type" units. 25 In essence 
the force goals that had been established at the Lisbon conference 
were to be stretched over the "long haul" so that NATO would and could 
cope with a Soviet threat lasting many years. 26 
The military connnander of SHAPE, General Matthew B. Ridgeway was 
not satisfied with what he regarded as a dangerous slowing of the defense 
effort. 27 However, the reduction of tension between the Soviet Union 
and the Western nations that appeared to accompany the death of Stalin; 
the pressure to reduce national military expenditures; and the military 
24rsmay, op. cit., p. 94. The Lisbon goal called for the establish-
ment of 96 divisions of whi~h 50 were to constitute a standing force 
between Switzerland and the Baltic. 
25Ibid., pp. 107-108. By "support type" units is meant engineer, 
signal, heavy artillery and logistical units that would provide support 
to the front line divisions in combat. 
26Ibid., pp. 104-107. 
27Matthew B. Ridgeway, "Second Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational 
Re;\dqua.rters,u Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (June 29, 1953), 
P• 902. 
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policy of the ·11:new l ook" pursued by the United States had become over-
riding considerations in determining NATO's military effort. !n 1955 
the NATO Council adopted a resolution to equip its forces with the most 
modern weapons, noting the progress that bad been made in this respect 
by the United States.28 The result was a cut of approximately one-half 
in the force goaJ.s established at the Lisbon conference for the sake of 
economy. The "forward strategy" bad not been aband~ned, but its 
effectiveness in view of the reduction in forces must be seriously 
questi oned. 29 
Reduction in NATO's conventionaJ. forces continued. Fr-encb units 
that had been withdrawn for service in Indo-China and North Africa were 
not replaced. The British government announced a ten per cent reduction 
in its military strength in 1956 and a year later proposed a drastic 
reorganization and reduction in its defEnse f orces scheduled to begin 
in 1957-58. 30 The British proposals caJ.led for rel.:fance to be placed 
on nuclear weapons and flexible striking power. Cuts in strength that 
would reduce their forces by one-half were to be phased through 1962.31 
On July 16, 1957, President Eisenhower ordered a cut of 100,000 men in 
the armed forces of t he United States of which approximately onewhalf 
28"North Atlantic Council Holds MinisteriaJ. Session, 11 Department~ · 
State Bulletin, Vol. 38 (December 26, 1955 ), pp. 1047-104.8 • . · , 
·,29see, Alfred N. Gruenther, "NATO - Our Greatest Instrument for 
Peace," Department of' State Bulletin, Vol. 34 (February 27, 1956), 
p. 333 . 
. 30 · 8 6 6 .. ~~ York Times, May 1 , 195 , pp. 1, • 
31Great Britain, "Defense: Outline of Future Policy," (Cmd. 124; 
London: H, M, Stationary Office, April, 1957) as quoted by M. ·Ma-rg-a.I"e-t · 
Ball, NATO and the European CJnion Movement (New York, 1959), pp. 94.99. 
was to be from the army.32 The ~ffect of the reductions in conventional 
forces was to cause the German rearmament and contribution to NATO to be 
slowed. It was difficult for many Germans to see tije need for twelve 
German NATO divisions when elsewhere reduction in forces was the order 
of the day.33 Within NATO local ground forces began to be spoken of as 
having primarily a "trip wire" or "plate-glass function" - that is, the 
filnction of signalling by their resistance, however brief, the fact 
that a major war had broken o~t, as well as forcing the enemy to send 
enough troops to make the aggression unequivocal.34 
I 
With the reduction in its conventional forces, NATO strategy came 
to rely more and more upon nuclear weapons to deter and defend against 
limited threats. In December, 1957 the NATO Council decided to .establish 
readily available stocks of nuclear warheads and to equip the Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) with intermediate range ballistic 
missiles. Prior to this the United States representative to the NATO 
Council had informed it that advanced defensive weapons were being 
included in the mutual aid program for the coming year.35 In spite of 
the addition of nuclear weapons to the strength of NATO mounting 
criticism in Europe was developing over the existing strategy.36 
32The ~ York Times, July 17, 1957, pp. 1, 8. 
33speier, ££· cit., pp. 13-17. 
34The !!:! !2!! Times, December 20, 1957, p. 8. 
35"Advanced Wea1>ons in U. s. Mutual Aid Program," NATO Letter, 
Vol. 5, No. 5 (May, 1957), P• 3. 
36rniis thought was voiced at the Third Seasion .of' the Western 
Union Assembly. See, Ball,~·~·, PP• 403~404. 
37 
Some members of NATO believe the United States lacks an adeq~te 
conception of-European problems. For example, in determining tar~ts 
for atomic counter-attack the approach of the United States may differ 
sharply from that of their European allies. · For the United States, the 
importance of turning back the Soviet advance would justify hitting any 
target short of provoking an all-out attack upon its own territory. To 
"the continental members of the alliance any extensi<:>n of the target 
area would re~ult in greater atomic casualties and damag~ to them. 
What may seem limited to Americans may appear total in European eyes.37 
The NATO military exercise, Ca.rte Blanche, which took place in 
West'·Germany, Holland, Belgium and France in June, 1955, is perhaps the 
best illustration, of the Euroi;,ean point-of-view. Tbe purpose of this 
maneuver was to test NATO forces under simulated conditions of atomic 
war. When during the course of the exercise many atomic bombs were 
presumably dropped on German soil, the West German Bunde&tag was moved 
. . 
to debate the implications of nuclear. war to the Federal Republic. In 
. . . 
the course of the discussions it was est:itnated that in reality such 
bombings would have killed 1.7 million Germans and incapacitated 3.5 
e . 
million more.3 Tbe reaction among the German population was so great 
that the Defense Ministry had to reassure the people that disaster was 
not innninent. 39 
A former Gennan general expressed the viewpoint of European critics 
of the strategy which reltes exclusively upon nuclear warfare. Tbe 
37Ben T. Moore, ~~~Future of Europe (New York, 1948), 
P• 199° · . · 
38speier, .2E.• ~·, pp. 182-183. 
39~., p. 188. 
base of such strategy, he pointed out, is economic. The NATO peoples 
hope t hat complete r e]iance upon atomic defense will reduce military 
expenditures and ultimately truces. There is too much concern, he 
argued, that high military expenditures will lower the standard of 
living thus furthering the cause of connnunism. He is unable to under-
stand why the West believes that despite a larger population it is 
incapable of mobilizing armed forces that will match those of the East. 
He argued further t hat t o resort to atomic weapons as a response to 
non-atomic at tack will cause the West to be considered as "atomic war 
criminals." Unless, however, str ong conventional forces are available, 
tbere is no other choice, either atomic weapons must be used or the 
West will be forced to capitulate .4o 
In May, 1957, during the NATO Council meeting, the foreign ministers 
of France, Germany and Norway pointed out the danger of too great a 
reduction in conventional weapo.ns. The communists, relying on 
conventionally armed forces would be free (as in the case of Hungary) 
to overrun bits of territory, secure in the conviction that NATO could 
not be in the position to defend these areas with conventional weapons 
a.o.d would not unleash total war by resorting to nuclear weapons. The 
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange, expressed this thought When ·. he 
said• "The Western Alliance must not be obliged to choose between 
. $.pocalypse and capitulation. 1141 
There are many who consider the use of nuclear weap.ons · in a limited 
war simply unfeasible unless the enemy should use them first. A senior 
4°t.ieutenant General (Ret.) Helmet Staedke as quoted in Ibid., 
p. 224. -
41Quoted in The New~ Times, May 3, 1957, P• 5 , 
39 
NATO commander expressed his concern on this questio~ in i958 by saying 
that he would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon no matter how 
small since even small atomic weapons would bring a nuclear holoeaust. 42 
Public opinion in Europe appears to support this viewpoint.43 
Criticism of the military strategy of the West is beginning to be 
recognized in NATO policy statements which since 1957 have refleeted 
greater interest in the ability of NATO to cope with limited or local 
attacks. The present commander of SHAPE, General Lauris Norstad, in an 
important speech discussed the advantages to political and military 
maneuverability by being able to meet, "less than ultimate threats with 
a decisive, but less than ultimate response."44 In support o:f this 
capability he bas pressed for a ready force for central Europe of 30 
divisions which would be adequate to meet a limited threat effectively 
by using conventional weapons.45 He has also remarked in speaking to 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that NATO would u~ conventional 
weap<>-ns whenever the situation so warranted. 46 
In spite o:f increased recognition of the need for an effective 
deterrent and defense based on conventional forces, the military 
42v1ce Admiral Charles R. Brown on assuming command of Allied 
F9rces Southern Europe in October, 1958. The New York Titaes, October 8, 
1958, p. 12. - - --
43speier, ££·~·,pp. 252-253. 
44Quoted in The~~ Times, November 13, 1957, P• 8. 
45Roger Hileman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," :t{ATO 
afld American Securi.ty, e·d. by Klaus Knorr (Princeton, 1959), pp. 30-31. 
4611Hearings on the Mutua.l Security Act of 1959, ,i House Commi'.btee 
~ F9reign Affairs, 86th Congress~ 1st session, p. 466. 
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strategy of the West continues to rely almost exclusively upon nuclear 
weapons. With both the Soviet Union and the United States possessing 
almost unlimited destructive capabilities every effort should be made 
to keep any limited confluct from expanding to total war. The success 
in limiting war will probably be determined on whether or not nuclear 
weapons will be employed. If the North Atlantic Alliance is to continue 
to provide for all its members the security for which it was created, 
a military strategy and capabilities will have to be developed than can 
cope with limited threats with a less than ultimate response. 
The Control of Nuclear Weapons 
While the military policy of NATO is clearly based upon the use of 
nuclear weapons, the control of these weapons has become an increasingly 
important problem. Some aspects of this problem were discussed by 
Paul- Henri Spaak, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
in the April, 1959, issue of Foreign Affairs. 47 Spaak cited the case 
of France to show the waste of effort, time and money because trust is 
lacking among the NATO members. France is duplicating, in developing 
its own nuclear weapons, what the United States and Great Britain have 
already accomplished. France is spending billions of francs and a 
wealth of effort to discover what her allies already know. If there is 
real comm.unity of interest among the alliance, would it not be better, 
asks Spaak, to spare France this effort and free her to devote her 
47Paul-Henri Spaak, "New Tests for NATO, 11 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37 
(April, 1959), PP• 357-359° 
energies to t~e common good.48 The problem, of nuclear sharing is 
c.omplex, hqwever, with military and -political factors which do no.t 
allow an easy solution. 
The anxiety of the European -membens et NATO over the control of 
nuclear weapons is based primarily upon tbe danger of a l~ited Soviet 
· · .. threat against one or more members of tlie alliance. Where the nature 
ot the threat is J..isil$ted, it is f~lt that tbe ·United States .might not 
ri.sk destructien to eupport the alliance ~h nuclear weapons. If' 
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there is insecurity :tn, Western Europe, there will be public pressure to 
e~bape from the ltorr1.ble threat of ~S:truction by 1Seeking -n:ttutrality ~ 
disarmament and arms control, as well ,as political e,ec011D11.odaticm Vith . . . 
'tbe ~viet UniC!>n. Such ,pr~s11w.es ma:i,· weµ generate· dissent and conflict 
within the NATO countries to the point where the exbtence of the 
alliance is seriously threatened. 
The sharing of nuclee.r weapons by the Unite·d States with its 
all,:ie.s would call for ~·maJor change of policy as well as Congressional 
legislation. The United States atomic en~~gy program bas been a 
closely controlled government monopoly relatively free tram the control 
that affect most governmental agencies and p~grams. It was not until 
the end of World War II .that the public iearn~ of the top secreL atom 
,· . . .. . 
bomb proJect. Secrecy and _security have r.emai~ed as important te.etors 
in the atomic energy program, -particularly in the military application 
.c:,t· $tootle energy. Any effort. t o release information pertaining to 
nuclear weapons to al,lied nati-ons re-ceives careful scru,tiny by Congress, 
'· 
48Ibid., p. 361. 
and the inclusion of nuclear weapons within the mutual aid program is 
fprbidden oy law.49 
Between 1946 and 1954 the sharing of atomic weapon information 
with foreign governments was limited to the British and Canadians on 
I 
the basis of agreements that had been made by Prime Minister Churchill 
and President Roosevelt at their wartime .meetings.5° Soviet espionage 
activities, the actions of Klaus Fuchs in supplying secret data to the 
Soviet Union, the Soviet act of exploding an atomic bomb, and the 
tensions of the "cold war" kept the United States from rel.axing its 
control over nuclear military matters until 1954. T~n the 1.946 Atomic 
Energy Act was amended to facilitate the exchange of information on 
the defensive use of atomic weapons with other nations or regional 
def'ense organizations. All such agreements must be signed by the 
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President and then must lie before the Joint Congressi_onal Committee on 
Atanic Energy for thirty days before they can take ef:f'ect.51 
In 1958 the Congress passed additional legislation to facilitate 
cooperation with our allies on atomic weapons. Under this legislation, 
certain non-nuclear material plus additional data could be provided. 
In addition, information on weapons design and material for prefabrication 
could be provided to allies who had made "considerable progress" in 
atomic weapon development.52 Specific agreements under this legislation 
49Morgan Thomas, Atomic Energy~ Congress (Ann Arbor, 1956), 
PP• 1-2. 
50ibid., P• 39. 
51~., P• 98. 
52Ibid., p. 155. 
have been made with Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey and 
Greece.53 
There is some indication that the United States m~y be considering 
a new approach to the question of. sharing ~ts nuclear weapons. During 
' 
December, 1959, and Januar;y;, 1960, the Joint Congressional Committee on 
43 
Atomic Energy was reported to have heid secret hearings in consideration 
' 
of this question. In February, 1960, President Eisenhower said that he 
would favor a change in the law to perm.it the United States to provide 
its allies with nuclear wea~ons . H~ said that the United States should 
not treat its allies as if they were "junior members" by denying them 
I 
weapons that the enemy has. 54 
In spite of this assertion i t appears that neither Congress r\Or the 
administration is quite ready at this time to change the existing 
policy on nuclear weapons.55 On March 20, 19~0, the President informed 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who had evidenced concern in this matter, 
that the United States had no intention of sharing nuclear weapons with 
its .allies.56 A few days earlier Secretary of Defense Gates conmented 
53"considerable progress" is subject to interpretation that to date 
has limited this assistance to the British. After the explosion of the 
second atomic device by the French in Aprii, 1960, Secretary of Defense 
Gates indicated that the United States does not regard two nuclear 
explosions as sufficient to admit France to the "nuclear club. " This 
is. interpreted to mean that France is not likely to get the atomic · 
weapons information she has been seeking from the United State1s. The 
~~Times, April 22, 1960, p. 7. 
54 · ~·, February 4, 1960, pp. 1, 12. 
55After the President's statement of February 4, 1960, endorsing 
the sharing of nuclear weapons with allies,members of ·congress warned 
the adnq.nistration not to transfer weapons without authority,~., p. ~. 
56Ibid., March 20, 1960, p. 1. 
that despite our desire to see our allies strong there was no intention 
to ask Congress to change the atomic energy law to p:ermit atomic 
wa;heads to b~; given to allies .at this time .;57 
From the concern shown by the Soviet Union over the'poss:l,bilityof 
United States' sharing its nuclear weapons, it would appear that Russia· 
does not favor instituting such a procedure with its allies.58 Indeed 
there is little reason for her to do so. The Russians possess a decisive 
military advantage over all contiguous areas, and in view of the 
political unreliability of some of the satellite states it would be a 
logical objective for the Soviet Union to prevent any development of 
nuclear capability under locbl control on the European continent. A 
second consideration is that the absence of a Western European nuclear 
capabil'ity facilitates the Russian practice of nuclear blackmail, or 
political pressure backed by threats of nuclear power, that has been so 
evident in Soviet diplomacy since the Suez crisis in 1956. 
RegardJ.ess of the attitude of the United States and the Soviet 
Union as to the diffusion of nuclear weapons it is evident that other 
states have the capability to develop these weapons without outside 
57Ibid., March 11, 1960, p. 1. It is possible that a misinter-
pretation of a NATO announcement concevning the integration of British, 
French and United States forces into brigades with nuclear capabilities 
under a single commander created this reaction. In the original 
announcement the statement was included that the formation would 
constitute greater NATO control over nuclear weapons previously kept in 
national hands. (See The New York Times, March 3, 1960, pp. 1, 4.) 
Later General Norstad denied plans to turn over nuclear warheads to the 
newly planned NATO force. (See The New York Times, March 11, 1960, 
P• L) --- . 
58 Ibid., March 20, 1960, p. l. For the Soviet protest against a 
Swiss plan to develop nuclear weapons, also see,~ New York Times, 
August 9, 1958, p. 4. 
. ·.~ . i ,' 
assistanee.59 That some states will find this desirable and feasible 
+he:r-
is confirmed by the French who exploded i:t;,s..first two atomic devices in 
F~uary and April of 1960. The fact that other states have the 
capability of producing nuclear weapons is an important consideration 
to the United States position in th:!.s matter :for it is logical that 
states which develop their own nuclear weapons without outside aid may 
be reluctant to share in the control of these weapons. 
There are several important arguments voiced by those opposed to 
nuclear sharing. One compares the diffusion of nuclear weapons to the 
opening of Pandora's box. Multiplying the number of states that have 
the power to start a thermo:.:-~0.c:lear war can be dangerous. Some small 
states are controlled by aggressive men whose concept of international 
responsibility is limited by nationalistic fervor. Presumably neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union relish the idea of being connnitted 
to a nuclear war by a third party. Another argument questions the 
effectiveness of nuclear sharing in that a limited capability of a small 
state can have only punitive rather than a strategic effect and that 
59see, Klaus Knorr, "Nuclear Weapons: 'Haves and Have Nots. ,rt 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April, 1958), pp. 167-177. Mr. Knorr states 
that it is believed that without outside aid, Canada, Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and 
India from among the Western-oriented or neutral states have the 
capability to begin nominal produ~tion of nuclear weapons by 1962-65. 
Of the Soviet bloc states, Czechcslovakia, Communist China and the German 
Democratic Rerublic also have such capability. Of the above states both 
Sweden and Switzerland are known to have considered a nuclear weapons 
program. See, "Sweden Between Two Worlds, tt The Economist (October 29, 
1956) as quoted by Rodger Hilsman, Military Policy and National Security, 
ed. W.W. Kaufman (Princeton, 1956), P• 189. There""are also reports 
that Communist China is ?lso developing a nuclear capability. See, 
The New York Times, August 18, 1958, pp. 1, 13. ---- ---- --- ---
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punishment can be dealt only at the cost of complete de~truction,6° 
Another point of view is that once all the states of NA~p have po~session 
of nuciear weapons the alliance will split apart, sine~ it will np 
longer have dependence upon the United States. In the s~e vein, there 
is the possibility that further reliance on nuclear weappns will serve 
to decrease even further NATO's conventional forces in aµ effort to 
cut ex~enditures . A last argument is based on the diffi~ulty of control. 
If each member has his own national dete+rent there extsts too much 
risk. On the other hand if nuclear weapons are given ~o the alliance 
each country would want its hand on "both the safety catph and the 
trigger. 1161 The result would be intolerable indecision in the use of 
the al+iance's most powerful weapons. 
Those who support nuclear sharing have submitted im~ortant reasons 
for such a program. One of the arguments for the spread of nuclear 
capabi+ities to the continental members of NATO is to increase military 
efficiency and improve control and speed of reaction 1~ the event of 
attack by the Soviet Union. As nuclear weapons become more available 
for ground use and as tactical doctrine is developed fpr fighting atomic 
battle~ on the ground, it will be necessary to integra~e nuclear 
weapon~ more closely with the fighting units they suppp~. Nuclear 
6oi good discussion of this point may be found in ~n article by, 
George w. Rathjens, Jr., "Notes on the Military Problems of Europe," 
World folitics, Vol, 10 (January, 1958), pp. 182-201. 
6lpaus Knorr, "Appendix - Aspects of NATO Strateg;r: A Conference 
Report," NATO and .American Security (Princeton, 1959), p, 321. 
sharing will enable our allies to integrate their own weapons within 
their own units thus being assured of timely nuclear support.62 
Another reason for giving each NATO nation a more independent 
power of retaliation is to offset the decline of credibility of the 
United States' use of its nuclear armed Strategic Air Command in the 
defense of these nations. 63 With their own nuclear arsenals, even 
modest ones, our allies might feel more secure, less dependent and less 
fearful and critical of the United States. If' the continental members 
of NATO are determined to develop nuclear weapons, assistance by the 
United States would save money and effort that by mutual agreement 
could be used at least in pa:ct to meet other critical defense needs. 
When one country uses a weapons system of another country, a military 
interdependence tends to develop between the two states. The increased < 
security received by the allies through so called 11nuclear diffusion" 
would, therefore, promote NATO cohesion as well as a better balanced 
strategy by allowing a greater contribution to conventional military 
resources.64 The failure to provide our allies with nuclear weapons, 
argued Secretary of State Dulles, may result in driving our allies 
toward neutralism without stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.65 
It is difficult to conceive of our European allies unleashing a 
unilateral attack upon the Soviet Union. It must be recognized, however, 
62Rodger Hilsman, 11Coalitions and Alliances," Military Policy and 
National Security, ed. W. w. Kauf'man (Princeton, 1956), p. 192. ~ 
63Brodie, _££• cit., p. 348. 
64 Osgood,_££• cit., p. 126. 
6~1'.B:erings, .Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," Subcommittee 
££ Agreements fs?! CooFeration, Joint Committee££ Atomic Energy, 85th 
Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 156, 446 ff. 525-27 as reported in~· 
that the ability to commit the United States to a nuclear war under 
circumstances with which we do not agree may in itself be~.the,. most 
important reason to share these weapons.66 If America permits a dis-
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tinction to grow between its military establishment and that of Western 
Europe, it will be only a matter of time before the United States is 
excluded from the continent. And if the Soviet Union persuades Western 
Europe to avoid the dangers of a nuclear war through the exclusion of 
atomic weapons the next. logical step would be to demand that United 
States forces withdraw f'rom Europe since we will have the only nuclear 
force on the continent.67 
Methods of Nuclear Sharing. If there 1:s ~:, change in present United 
States policy regarding the diff'usion of nuclear weapons, careful 
consideration must be given to the various alternatives which may be 
used in sharing our nuclear deterrent. Weapons could be given to 
selected allies that have demonstrated the capability of using and 
maintaining them. Perhaps more important would be the maturity 
demonstrated by that government in its foreign relations and the 
stability of its governmental institutions. Under such a system Great 
Britain would, as evidenced by past relationships in defense matters, 
~mdoubtedly have the highest priority to receive nuclear weapons. If, 
however, nuclear sharing is limited to the British and one or two 
selected allies, the problem of favoritism within the alliance arises 
and the alliance continues to be split between the "haves" and "have 
66osgood, op. cit., p. 126. 
67Henry A, Kissinger, 11 Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace, 11 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37 (October, 1958), pp. 12-13. 
nots." Yet differences in technology, population, economic ability to 
maintain an expensive weapons system and stability differ widely among 
the members of the alliance. This suggests an alternate system of 
nuclear sharing that can win wider support. 
The alternative to sharing nuclear missiles with selected allies on 
the basis of bilateral agreements is to share them with a group of 
allies. This could be done by supplying the weapons to NATO or to the 
I 
members of NATO who constitute the Western European Union (WEU), or to 
form an Atlantic Defense Union. Whatever solution is reached, the 
problem of efficiently integrating the control and use of nuclear 
weapons must be solved. Tl: .. t,.~e are some advantages in strengthening an 
integrated European nuclear ca:r;:·ability rather than an integrated 
capability based on NATO. The chances of achieving a distinctive 
European foreign policy based on the common interests of all members 
are greater in a European defense union than in a grouping whicb 
includes the United States. With their own nuclear deterrent, Western 
Europeans could assume the risks of military action to protect their 
interests overseas and at the same time deter the Soviet Union without 
having to rely on American support. In the same way, American policies 
in Asia and the Pacific could be pursued with greater independence. 68 
Within the Western European Union, there are controls already 
established over certain classes of armament to include nuclear weapons. 
Specifically these controls prohibit West Germany from manufacturing 
various military arms, provide control over weapon stock levels as 
68:For a detailed explanation of the advantages of nuclear integration ( 
within a European defense union, see Moore, 21?.• cit., pp. 207-211. . 
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determined by a majority vote and provide an inspection and reporting 
agency.· The inspection agency does not have control over NATO forces 
and depots. NATO, however, is obliged to inspect its own facilities and 
pass the information received to the w:im Council. In addition, the 
United States and Canada have agreed to inform the Western European 
Union of all military aid furnished to WEU members on the Continent.69 
Another alternative plan for sharing nuclear weapons is the 
development of an Atlantic Defense Union, integrating the strategic air 
and missile forces of' the United States and Great Britain in a unified 
Atlantic cmnnnand similar to SHAPE. Such integration would provide the 
European members of the All::.,~-~~:.=: with an element of control over the 
strategic nuclear deterrent aw1 would eliminate any decline in 
confidence in the availability of American nuclear support. A union of 
this type would also eliminate duplication of nuclear build-up and 
ultimately provide greater efficiency in defense production. The 
success of this far reaching plan would depend on the degree of 
certainty with which all parties could be sure that the integrated 
force would be used in their behalf.70 
In giving nuclear weapons to NATO as presently constituted, there 
is the problem of ceding to a military commander of an alliance the 
responsibility for the survival of the nations constituting the 
alliance. This is difficult for democratic nations to do. If, as is 
likely, the decision to use the weapons must be subject to the veto of 
69 11Protocol No. III and DI on Control of Armaments, " signed a.t 
Paris by the WEU states on October 23, 1954 as summarized by Ball, 
~- cit., pp. 394-395. 
7~oore, ~- cit., pp. 200-207. 
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national governments) there cou.ld be indecision and resulting delay 
that would tend to neutralize the effective use of these weapons. 
Political decisions made ahead of time regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons by the alliance, could, however) cover some of the more clear 
cut contingencies that would allow effective use of these weapons. 
A brief description of the present situation in regard to nuclear 
weapons within Western Europe will point up some of the difficulties 
being encountered in regard to nuclear sharing. Beginning in 1957 the 
United. States ·began to include missiles which have a nuclear capability 
(less the nuclear components) in its mutual aid programs for the NATO 
countries. Allocations of t:.:,,:rG wea11ons were based in part upon the 
guidance of NATO military authorities. At the same time, a steadily 
increasing 1°,i)mber of NATO military personnel have been and continue to 
receive training in the operation and maintenance of these weapons.71 
It was planned originally to establish intermediate range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) bases in Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece or Cyprus, 
and Turkey. As of July,1960, the only bases established have been in 
the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey, At the end of October, 1959, the 
United States announced that it would not establish any more of the Thor 
IRBM bases in Europe,72 
7libid., p. 87. 
72The New York Times, October 31, 1959, p. 1. The Thor and Jupiter 
IRBM weapori's" areliquid fueled and employed from fixed bases. Because 
these weapons require a relatively long time to prepare for use, they 
are considered highly vulnerable to enemy destruction and are therefore 
considered as interim weapons. On April 22, 1960, Secretary of Defense 
Gates mentioned that the United States has proposed establishing mobile 
nuclear bases in Europe using the solid fueled Polaris missile that can 
be fired quickly. ~New~ Times, April 22, 1960, p. 7, 
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The establishment of missile bases in Europe has been a difficult 
and time-cons1.Ulling process. In the matter of control over the missiles 
and warheads, there are two different arrangements, one of which 
includes NATO and the other which does not. The British-American 
agreement signed February 22, 19B8, provides for British ownership and 
operation of missiles that the United States places on British territory; 
the United States owns the nuclear warheads and the decision to launch 
the missiles is t ai~en jointly. 73 NATO has no direct control over these 
missi les. Agreements with Italy and Turkey were negotiated in 1959 
for the establishment of IRBM bases. In each case the United States 
controls the nuclear warhea > .. but the host government retains the veto 
over firing the missiles . In t he case of missiles based in Italy and 
Turkey, however, NATO has command of the missile units and approval to 
launch the weapons rests also with the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, 
Europe,74 
The United States has not been able to conclude any agreement with 
France for the establishment of nuclear bases. The French consider 
that they are discriminated against in the realm of nuclear weapons 
and appear determined to obtain equality. France feels that it is 
intolerable that the United States should .monopolize the keys to the safe 
containing the weapons upon which European security rests.75 It was 
primarily because the United States would not make any concessions in 
this matter that the French Government refused to permit stockpiles of 
73Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 38 (March 17, 1958), pp. 
481-489. ~ 
74The New York Times, October 11, 1959, p. 1. 
75~., February 8, 1960, p. 3. \ 
) 
American nuclear weapons on French soil. This in turn has recently 
forced United States air units within the NATO connn.and to move from 
bases in France to bases in Great Britain.76 
Whether desirable or not, strategic nuclear diffusion appears to 
be inevitable and only a question of time. The smaller allies may 
remain satisfied with inferior military capacities, but if France 
could not be prevented from its determination to join the nuclear 
'haves," it can be expected that Italy and West Germany will in time 
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demand nuclear independence. Before this time arrives, American policy 
has the opportunity of helping its allies through its nuclear weapons 
know-bow, as well as sha.rinc; our nuclear deterrent with them. ~e 
decision· of the United States in the problem of nuclear sharing will 
be important to the future of the Nor.th Atlantic .Alliance. 
CHAP~R~ 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
In the opinion of some of the NATO members, the North Atlantic 
Alliance bas passed from its military stage to a period of political 
and economic activity. The fear of Soviet military aggression no longer 
seems as urgent, in spite of occasional periods of tension, as it did 
during the early years when NATO was being created. As a consequence 
the pressure within the Western coalition to find political solutions 
to the outstanding issues that lie between the Soviet Union and the NATO 
states bas steadily increased. The problem that NATO faces in its non-
military relationship with the Soviet Union is to find bases for realistic 
negotiation that can be supported by the entire alliance. With diverse 
interests, and the pursuit of a nationalistic policy on the part of 
some members, it has been difficult for the alliance to face the Soviet 
Union united behind a common policy. 
The Soviet Union has somewhat changed its emphasis .in foreign 
affairs. There has been a decided shift of emphasis from military pressure 
in Europe to the less blatant forms of political and economic presstµ"e. 
In addition there has been a shift of emphasis to the Middle East and 
Africa with the result that the cold war is being continued in lands far 
from Europe. This Soviet action has increased the difficulties of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, but at the same time has made cooperative effort 
even more essential, It is, in theory, possible for a single co'Ul.ltry 
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to defend itself against a single enemy near home, but it is difficult 
if not impossible for a single country to defend against multiple threats 
ranging from the Caribbean to the Sea of Japan.1 
In this chapter there will be a discussion of three important non-
military issues that threaten the solidarity of NATO. The first is 
"disengagement," a political proposal which is especially attractive to 
the Federal Republic of Germany as a means of reunification. The second 
is the force of nationalism by which the independent policies of some 
NATO members have detracted from the effectiveness of the alliance, and 
the third concerns the lack of adaptability of NATO to the unification of 
either the political or economic institutions of the member states. 
Disengagement 
Of the political issues of major importance to NATO and to the 
relationship of the United States with Western Europe, none has more 
serious implications to existing policies than the concept of "disengage-
ment.112 This concept expresses the idea of the reduction and separation 
of military forces in Central Europe in the hope that tensions would be 
reduced, thereby facilitating eventual political settlement between the 
Soviet Union and the nations of NATO. 
Although there have been various versions of the meaning of 
disengagement, each contains the first and usually one or more of the 
1Drew Middleton, "If the U. S. Does Not Lead," The New York Times 
Magazine (December 13, 1959 ), p. 81. - - --
2see George F. Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West (New York, 1957), 
as well as his article, 11 Disengagement Revisited, "ii"'p'ore'Ign Affairs, Vol. 37 
(January., 1959), pp. 187-210, for detailed explanation of the idea of 
"disengagement. 11 The impetus of 11 disengagement 11 is credited in part to 
Kennan's writings. 
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following six elements: 1) The withdrawal of Soviet and American forces 
from East and West Germany; 2) the withdrawal of Soviet and American 
forces from some or all the remaining satellite states and West European 
states; 3) arms limitation and control over the territories from which 
forces have been withd.ravm; 4) a political settlement concerning both 
East and West Germany; 5) the partial or complete breakup of the Warsaw 
Pact Alliance and the North Atlantic Alliance; 6) a guarantee of the 
agreements reached, by the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly 
other states.3 
There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages of disengagement, 
but the military advantages appear to be outweighed by the disadvantages. 
Although the proponents of disengagement argue tbat the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from East Germany and perhaps from Poland and other states 
of the Soviet bloc in return for a commensurate withdrawal of American 
and British military forces would be of military value to the West in 
that it would reduce the possibility of war by accident resulting from 
powerful opposing forces that are in close proximity, it is questionable 
that the creation of a buffer zone by the withdrawal of military forces 
of major powers actually reduces the danger of war. The withdrawal of 
American forces from South Korea prior to 1950 did not prevent aggression 
nor did the riots in East Germany and the revolt in Hungary result in 
war. As it has often been asserted both in and out of NATO conferences, 
that if an accident were to lead to war, someone would have to decide 
that the time had come to start a war. 4 
3Robert E. Osgood, ''NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration, 11 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), pp. 128-129, 
4see, Klaus Knorr, "Appendix-Aspects of NATO Strategy, a Conference 
Report,"~ and American Security, ed. Klaus Knorr (Princeton, 1959), 
p, 332. 
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The proponents of disengagement suggest that another possible 
military advantage of disengagement is that it would reduce the Soviet 
capabilities for surprise attack on the ground. The validity of this 
argillllent would have been greater eleven years ago when Western forces 
were organized for occupation rather than defense. Withdrawal of Russian 
forces to the Bug River bordering Poland and the Soviet Union, a distance 
of 500 plus miles from their present positions, would have to be matched 
by a similar withdrawal of British and American forces. In effect this 
would mean withdrawal from Continental Europe. It is doubtful if .American 
ground units could be returned in sufficient time to counter a Soviet 
ground thrust, since the time of return to present position has been 
estimated at from 12-18 to 72 hours. 5 The greatest danger in disengs,ge-
me~t to the North Atlantic Alliance is in the possibility that American 
military forces will be withdrawn from the continent. One eminent critic 
of disengagement points out that once withdrawal begins it will not be 
complete until all American, British and Canadian troops have departed 
Europe. 6 
5Dean Acheson, 11The Illusion of Disengagement," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 36 (April, 1958), ·p, 376. The limitations of United States air lift 
capability were illustrated in the Lebanon crisis where it took maximum 
effort to transport one battle group plus supporting troops from Germany. 
For a report of air lift inadequacy see John B. Spore, "What About Air 
Lift," Army, September, 1958, pp. 29.go. That the air lift situation has 
not particularly improved during the past two years is evident by 
Exercise Big Slam held in Puerto Rico during March, 1960, as reported in, 
The New York Times, March 16, 1960, p. 24. 
6Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 36 (April, 1958), p, 377. T'Dis article presents an excellent 
argument against disengagement. See also, Henry A. Kissinger, "Missiles 
and the Western Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April, 1958), p. 395, 
One of the proposals for disengagement, the Rapacki Plan,7 is based 
in part upon a nuclear free zone in East and West Germany, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, but the denuclearization of a limited area, would not 
preclude the use of nuclear weapons tactically. It would only mean 
that the weapons could not initially be deployed forward. With the 
increased effectiveness of missile delivery systems and with air delivery, 
it is difficult to see how NATO could benefit from this plan. 
Not all proposals for disengagement call for the withdrawal of 
United States troops from the European Continent. Neither George Kennan 
nor Hugh Gaitskell in their proposals for disengagement have suggested 
that the United States withdraw its forces entirely from Europe.8 Holding 
present force levels in Europe is possible, but it is more reasonable to 
assume that whatever remains of the NATO shield would be considerably 
smaller in size if disengagement was accomplished. The formal with-
drawal of 12 West German divisions would not remove them completely as a 
factor in NATO defense, and it may be possible in the event of attack 
or threat of attack to re-establish liaison between the West German Army 
7Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, first proposed this plan 
in a speech at the United Nations in October, 1957. A year later he 
modified his plan to provide for a two stage approach to disengagement. 
During the first stage there would be a ban on production of nuclear 
weapons and these weapons would not be given to states that did not 
possess them at the time of the agreement. In stage two the Soviet Union 
and the United States would progressively eliminate nuclear weapons 
altogether in this area. See, The New York Times, March 22, 1959, p, E 5, 
8Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited,"~· c_i_t _., pp. 198-199, See also 
Hugh Gaitskell, "Disengagement: Why? How?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 
(July, 1958), pp. 539-556. Kennan admits that NATO would be weakened 
militarily, but believes the possible political advantages to be worth 
this risk. Gaitskell, head of the British Labor Party, in pr~posing a 
plan not unlike the Rapacki Plan makes a special point of insisting that 
both American and British forces remain on the continent in order to 
convince both the Soviet Union and our NATO allies that Western Europe 
will not be abandoned and that the United States and Great Britain will 
continue to resist aggression. 
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and NATo.9 This point of view overlooks t he difficulties of military 
operations of separate forces without prior close liaison or integration. 
Also i gnored is the status of the present West German Army in a reunified 
Germany where i ntegration with East German Forces may render any 
cooperation with NATO ineffective. An additional difficulty would be 
found in shi f ting present non-German NATO forces from West Germany to 
other NATO areas . In the low countries there is no room for troops; in 
France there is some room, but there is also an unsecure political 
situat i on. The most logical a rea t o shift forces presently in West 
Germany would be to the Iberian Peninsula or North Africa. From this 
analysis it appears that, from t he point of view of military strategy, 
the weight of argument is against disengagement.lo 
In spit e of its effect upon military strategy, the implications of 
disengagement are largely political, First of all, disengagement calls 
for the neutralization and reunification of Germany. This means the with-
drawal of West Germany from NATO and from the Western European Union, 
For as George Kennan pointed out, the Soviet Union cannot possibly agree 
to terms that would allow a unified Ger.many to remain with the West.11 
The Western policy, on the other hand, has pressed continually for the 
unification of Germany under one government chosen through free elections 
which would determine which obligations the united Germany would affirm 
or reject. This policy is based upon the belief that a freely elected 
all German government would be oriented to the West.12 
9Knorr, ~· .£!:!:.•, p. 332, 
lOThis point is also expressed by some West German military e~erts, 
See, Hans Speier, German Rearmament~ Atomic!!!!: (Evanston, 1957), P• 240. 
11Kennan, Russia,~~~~~' op, cit., PP• 37-39, 
l2Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York, 1958), 
PP• 103-104. - - - -
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A German withdrawal from NATO would have serious consequences for the 
alliance. Since 1950, NATO's strategy has assumed that there would be a 
substantial defense contribution by West Germany. Without a German 
Gontribution to the alliance, there would be a shift of power politically 
as well as militarily away from the West. The difficulties of keeping a 
united Germany neutral would probably create greater world tension than 
has existed up to now. A vital and dynamic state such as Germany is bound 
to have ambitions and objectives that would push her either toward the 
East or toward the West.13 Although proponents of disengagement have 
not advocated that a lmited Germany sever economic as well as military 
ties with the West, it is aga-5x1 difficult to see the Soviet Union 
permitting the existing economic integration that has been established 
with West Germany and Western Europe to continue when such participation 
would surely draw Germany closer to the West. Without German participa-
tion the economic integration that has been so laboriously built up within 
Western Europe would be threatened, and French fears of Germany, so 
recently stifled, revived. 
Of the members of NATO the greatest interest in disengagement is 
found in the last state to join the alliance, the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This is because disengagement offers a possible solution to 
the major problem within the Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany.14 
The political party controlling the government is the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) lead by Premier Konrad Adenauer. In defense matters, the 
13Acheson, op. cit., p. 377, 
11'Jrri tz Erler, "The Relmification of Germany and Security for 
Europe," World Rill.tics, Vol. 10 (April, 1958), p. 368. 
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CDU has supported rearmament, the establishment of missile bases on 
German soil and participation in NATO, Politically, the CDU has 
supported integration with Western Europe and has sought reunification 
through cooperation with the West. Although the policies of the Adenauer 
government have been successful in rearming West Germ.any within the 
framework of NATO, it receives increased criticism on the matter of 
reunification.15 The principal minority part in Germany, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), has been extremely critical of West Germany's 
participation in NATO at what they consider to be the price of a united 
Germany.16 The SPD has opposed rearmament and participation in NATO. 
The only way to reunification; in their opinion, is through a policy of 
neutrality for which NATO is a stumbling block.17 Regardless of the 
criticism, however, the German contribution to NATO continues to grow 
and makes any future change in policy more difficl,l]_ t to implement. 
Of the other NATO powers, disengagement is heard most frequently in 
Great Britain where the current minority Labor Party has officially 
connnitted itself to this program.18 Unlike the West German Socialist 
15The ~ York Times, December 7, 1958, p. 5. 
16speier, .££·~·,PP• 9, 16. 
17The material on the views of the principal German political parties 
is taken from interviews of members of West German legislature, the 
Bundestag by a public opinion research organization whose work was analyzed 
and tabulated by the Institute for International Social Research. The 
results were published in a book by, Lloyd A. Free, Six Allies and a 
Neutral (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 131-156, The political implicatio~of 
bath the SPD and the CDU as ta disengagement cannot be overlooked. The 
.minority SPD is primarily Protestant as is East Germany. In the event 
of free elections within a unified Germany the SPD would stand a good 
chance of winning power. On the other hand, the status quo party, the 
Catholic CDU, may well adopt its position of Western cooperation from 
similar considerations. 
l8Gaitskell, :?.I:· cit., p. 540. 
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Party, the Labor Party supports the North Atlantic Alliance and refuses 
to consider any plan that calls for the total evacuation of British and 
American forces from the continent. The Conservative Party opposes dis-
engagement by a substantial majority.19 In spite of the Conservative 
Party's official stand, the British are showing increased interest in the 
idea of basing the security of Western Europe on some form of cooperation 
with the Soviet bloc in the regional limitation and control of weapons 
and forces. It is believed, however, that negotiations with the Soviet 
Union can be taken only on the basis of unity and strength, and there is 
some doubt if the West has yet reached that position. 20 
Of the two remaining major NATO powers, France and the United States, 
neither has evidenced any great degree of interest in disengagement. 
France, in particular, though highly critical of NATO in many areas, is 
strongly opposed to any withdrawal of British and American forces from 
the continent of Europe. 21 Any plan that would tend to loosen the bonds 
that have tied the Federal Republic of Germany to Western Europe would 
undoubtedly be strongly resisted by France. In the United States, 
disengagement is not an issue. There is no indication that there is 
any political difference of opinion on this subject. There have been, 
however, several influential men who have made statements favorable to 
what woill.d be, in effect, disengagement. 22 While this point could become 
19Free, op. cit., p. 58. 
20nenis Healey, "Britain and NATO," NATO and Atrerican Security, ed. 
Klaus Knorr (Princeton, 1959), pp. 232-233-;-~ 
21Free, ~· cit., pp. 101-103. 
22The New York Times, March 22, 1959, p. E 5, See also, Speier, 
op. cit., pp. 92-93, 240-241. 
more popular when the United States' need for overseas bases dimin~shes, 
the current .A.nierican viewpoint was sun'lll1ed up by General Alfred M. Gruenther 
when he said that "any plan calling for moving back of Allied and Soviet 
troops in Europe would contain tremendous bear traps for the United 
States". 23 
Disengagement could strike at the very heart of NATO by the with-
drawal of West Germany from NATO as well as setting the stage for the 
withdrawal of British and United States forces from the continent. It 
would force the complete revision of NATO's military plans and strategy, 
but the temptations of this political solution to the reunification of 
Germ.any and East-West-tension in general has found wide acceptance in two 
important NATO states. Though not currently a critical issue within NATO, 
disengagement may become one of the most difficult issues that the alliance 
will have to face. 
Nationalism 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears to be increasingly 
beset with the nationalistic ambitions of some qf its members. To one 
New York Times political observer, the early days of the alliance were 
typified by a sense of camaraderie, a unity of mission and a willingness 
to endure, that has slowly dissipated as Europe has become prosperous. 24 
Peace and prosperity have fostered national aspirations at the expense 
of collective security. The people of Europe seem to be less concerned 
with the Soviet threat in Europe and increasingly concerned about the 
23The New York Times, April 5, 1959, p. 3. -~-
24Ibid., December 20, 1959, p. E 5. 
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Soviet threat of economic and political penetrations in the overseas 
possessions. Claims of hegemony have been revived i~ spite of the fact 
that they no longer have a real basis. Instead of concentrating on a 
common future, there is a tendency to look back. As a result of the 
revival of nationalism, the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance is 
threatened, 25 
The importance of a united Western coalition in negotiating out-
standing issues with the Soviet Union was developed in a recent analysis 
which pointed out that a division of Western Europe 11 into a rabble of ill-
armed nationalisms 11 merely facilitates the Soviet diplomatic practice of 
making individual offers of treaties. 26 If a single European state 
wishes to pursue a purely nationalistic policy in its relations with the 
Soviet Union, the Russians would be delighted to oblige. On the other 
hand, a u11ited Western alliance that knows exactly what it wants and 
where it is going, can realistically and effectively meet the Soviet 
Union's offensive moves, be they military, political or economic, 
An example of how nationalism can weaken the North Atlantic Alliance 
militarily and politically is illustrated by the attitude of distrust 
that the British have evidenced toward West Germany during the past few 
months. The British press, which in this case appears to express a popu. 
lar opinion, has expressed doubts that democracy has really taken root 
in Germany. The domination of Chancellor Adenauer over the govermnent 
of the Federal Republic is cited as evidence of the German requirement 
25Hans Koln, "Has NATO a Future," NATO Letter, Vol. 8, No. 5 (May, 
1960)., pp, 6-8, 
26Drew Middleton, 11If the U. S. Does Not Lead, 11 The New Yorls: Times 
Magazine, December 13, 1959, p. 81. - - -
for a strong leader. In short, the British believe that the Gerr11ans of 
1960 are but little different from the militaristic and nationalistic 
Germans of 1939, and that it is just a matter of time until Germany uses 
its geographical position between the West and the East to bar§3,in for 
27 special advantages. The fact that West German policies over the past 
eleven years do not warrant the British fears does not alter them. The 
outbreak of anti-Semitism that took place in West Germany in late 
December, 1959, and early January, 1960, did nothing to discourage 
20 
British opinion. 0 
British doubts about West Germany came to a head over the report, at 
first unofficial but later confirm.ea_, that the Bonn Government was 
seeking a bilateral agreement with Spain for military bases. The Germans, 
crowded for space and frustrated over the inability of NATO to integrate 
a military supply system, bad been seeking to lease training areas and 
bases from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Spain. 
Unable to reach an agreement with NATO members, West German Defe:ase 
Minister Strauss set out on the Spanish venture. 29 When the news of 
these negotiations was made public, somewhat prematurely it might oe added, 
there were iTIJ1nediate outcrys in Britain condemning the German action,30 
27Drew Middleton, "Germany: British Doubts vs. French Logic," The 
New~ Times Magazine, March 13, 1960, pp, 1, 80. For a recent article 
about the revival of German nationalism and desire for unification see, 
Flora Lewis, "The Unstable States of Germany,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol, 38 
(July, 1960), pp, 588-597, 
28"Germany's Notting HUl," The Economist, Vol. 194 (January 9, 
1960), pp. 85-86. It should be noted that isolated outbreaks of an anti-
Semitic nature also occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
29The ~ York Times, February 28, 1960, p. 3. 
30"Fortress in Spain," The Economist, Vol. 194 (March 5, 1960), 
PP• 876-878. 
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There is no provision in the North Atlantic Alliance tbat precludes 
special bilaterial :military agreements with states outside the alliance. 
The United States has, in fact, concluded agreements with Spain for 
.military bases. While there is no argument about the West Germar~ 
requirement for additional military facilities, there are political 
reasons that make agreement with Spain difficult,31 The British, and 
to a lesser extent the French, have never forgotten the support given 
by Germany to the forces of General Francisco Franco during the Spanish 
Civil War as well as the sympathetic neutrality of the Spanish government 
toward the Axis during World War II. The British Labor Party in particular 
feels strongly about this matter,32 
The results of the German efforts to obtain bases in Spain are 
mixed. The other NATO States were sufficiently stirred to offer addi-
tional bases to Germany. Though Britain indicated clearly that it would 
prefer German military negotiations and bases to remain within NATO, the 
House of Connnons after debate voted full support for West Germany as a 
full and equal partner in the Atlantic Alliance,33 The British attitude, 
however, did not go unnoticed by the Germans who reacted with anger and 
indignation against the public scolding Germany had received,34 
The distrust of Germany can have a disastrous effect upon the 
military and political cooperation of NATO. The British attitude toward 
West Germany has a particularly serious effect on the Dp.tch, the Danes 
3l~ New~ Times, February 16, 1960, p. 16. 
32Ibid., March 2, 1960, p. 2, 
3310c. cit. 
and the Norwegians, who look closely to Britain fOJ .. ~ leadership. Mo st 
assuredly their sympathies toward West Germany do not match the 1',rench 
or American. 35 rrhe full military power of the alliance cannot be 
exerted as long as a powerful public opinion in the United Kingdom 
attacks the government and its support of NATO whenever there is any 
development of German military strength. For Germany to be wanted by 
some members of the alliance and rejected by others would 1.,mdoubtedly 
encourage any nationalistic elements and certainly cause the Germans to 
look more closely at the possibility of separate negotiations with the 
Soviet Union over reunification of East and West Germany. 
Although the syndrome of nationalism is expressed to some degree in 
the majority of the fifteen NATO states, it is the case of France that 
gives the greatest concern to the supporters of the North ii..tlantic 
Alliance. The fact that France is geographically important makes it 
essential to NATO for better or worse. France is the most important 
piece of real estate within NATO. When French political organization is 
weak, ineffectual and disorganized, NATO suffers. When France cannot 
cope with the nationalist aspirations of its overseas possessions, thus 
giving anti-.western influence a chance to grow and forcing the employment 
of military units away from Metropolitan France, the alliance suffers. 
Most of the communicative installations, supply and maintenance a.epots 
and railroads that would nourish any Western defensive effort against a 
Soviet invasion are situated on French soil. Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe, located outside Paris, is the nerve center of the allied 
35Middleton, "Germany: British Doubts vs. French Logic," op. cit., 
P• 83. 
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military e.ffort, just as the headquarters of NA.TO in Paris is the political 
brain of the alliance. It is impossible to see the defense of Europe 
without the assistance and cooperation of France. As John Foster Dulles 
once remarked, 11 if France goes, Germany is a parachute operation. 11 36 
French nationalism is centered around the figure of President Cbarles 
de Ga,Jlle, wbose actions are dominated by the desire to restore France to 
the position of influence and greatness it enjoyed prior to World War II. 37 
From the beginning of t11e Atlantic Alliance, President de Gaiule has 1Jeen 
critical of the NATO organization which in his opinion has further sub-
ordinated France to the United States. The United States' stand in the 
Suez affair was disillusionj_r:,.g to the Fren.ch. Much bitterness developed 
toward the United States for its lack of support, which in turn has been 
a motivating force for the French to develop military independence from 
the United States _38 
President de Gav.lle and the French nationalists criticize the 
military role of NATO on several points. The first is based on the 
conten·~ion that the Atlantic Pact is directed toward the defense of 
Western Europe, which is not threatened, while neglecting Asia and Africa 
which are threatened.39 The French nationalfats believe that the 
geographical bo1.mdaries of NATO are too limited and that the alliance 
---·---
36The New York Times, December 20) 19 59, 1'). E 5, 
37Throughout 1959 one of tbe central themes in articles concerning 
France and Presid.ent de Gaulle was the issue of the "grandeur" of France. 
For example, see, The New York Tj_mes, March 22, 1959, p. E 5; Robert C. 
Doty, 11 The Complex Issue of 'Grandeur, 1 " The New York Times Me,gazine, 
November 15, 1959, pp 11-13, 108~109; Edgar s:-Fi:°rrniss, Jr., France 
Troubled Ally (New York, 1960), pp, 4-63-1-1.68. 
38 Free, op. cit., p. 91, 
should deal with problems on a worJd-wide scale. The second criticism 
is based upon the belief that the United States and Great Br:i.tain have 
formed a two-power conclave, leaving France to tag along. 40 The third 
objection concerns military integration within NATO. President de Gaulle 
firmly bel:i.eves that troops fight better unde:r their own national colors 
and this it is essential for each nation - France, at any rate - to 
control its mm defense and have the capacity for independent action .1+1 
A final contention :Ls that France has been denied its fair share of 
l,2 
important positions in the NATO command structure.-, 
The most serious effect of the French nationalist attitude is upon 
the military integration of J\J\'110 forces. The principle of integration 
has been declared, by General Norsta.11:d the present SHAPE Commander., to 
be vital to tbe military efficiency of the alliance.43 Because of the 
French point of view, there has been little or no integration of the 
various continental air defense systems or military supply systems. In 
addition the French have refused to stockpile 1,11issiles and atomic warhes,ds 
on French soil under a joint control agreement with the United States. 
Some observerr3 believe that France will compromise on the que8tion of 
integration providing it is afforded a great.er voice in NATO decis5.on 
making.44 
4~urniss., .QJ2• cit • ., p, 461~. The Near East crisis of 1958 dm~ing 
which the United States and Great Britain decj_ded to take concerted 
action in Lebanon and Jordan is an example of the policy cited. 
1~1 rhe N~ York Times, December 13, 1959.:i p. E 5, 
42Furniss., op. cit., p. ~-65, 
43The ~ York Tj_mes., December 13, 1959, p. E 5, 
44Ib. d S 1 F · ·' l c6 __ i_., ee a so, 0 urniss, op.~·.:> p. ~o:>, 
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There are, however, difficulties in giving France the preponderant 
voice within NATO that many French leaders would prefer:, or in accepting 
the French proposal that the United States, Great Britain and France 
combine to form a three-power directorate to consider problems in relation 
to global strategy. 45 The other European members, particularly Italy 
and Germany, would most certainly object to such a plan, and the develop-
ment of political consultation, which has improved steadily within NATO 
since 1956, would be threatened. 
To some extent the French position on NATO is based upon a cultural 
anti-Americanism. The French, whose culture has had influence far out 
of proportion to its power in Lrternational politics, feel that their 
way of life is seriously threatened by the modern technological and 
social evolution that has been represented by the United States. 1+6 The 
cultural fears of the French intellectuals carry strong political over-
tones, and since NATO has come to be thought of as representing United 
States policy, many French prefer to disassocj_ate themselves also from 
it. 
The French feel to a greater extent than the other European members 
of NATO that agreement is lackj_ng as to the purposes of the Worth Atlantic 
Alliance. 47 This in part probably reflects their own disagreement with 
NATO's policies. The problem, however, of French ambitions pressing 
for French 'grandeur' and international prestige poses a serious threat 
to the North Atlantic Alliance as it is presently constituted. 
45see Furniss, op. cit., pp. ~-6~6; and Free, op. cit., p, 110, 
4611 'd 96 __l?2:_ • ' p • • 
47Ibid., pp, 105-106. 
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Political and Economic Unification 
In a speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of NATO, Lester B, 
Pearson, who had represented Canada on the occasion of the signing of 
the treaty, concluded that fear is the strongest motivating force for 
the coalition. He went on to question what would happen to the alliance 
when fear no longer exists. bf what use are the countless plans for NATO 
unity and non-military cooperation if they are never taken out of the 
pigeonholes of the various foreign offices and put to work, ~,8 
Since 1956, there has been an increased realization by some influen-
tial Western statesmen that a purely military alliance is not enough to 
cope with the political and cc:onomic challenge of the Soviet Union, The 
recent Secretary General of NATO believes it is necessary not only to 
explain to the NATO peoJ?les that they might one day have to defend t):lem-
selves in corm:non against a common enemy, but also they must also learn 
to live together and understand what interests they have in connnon. 1~9 
The force of nationalism plus the different national interests of the 
NATO members appear, however, to have kept the alliance from being the 
medium of Western unity for which so many have hoped. 
The difficulties j_n achj_eving political and economic w.1ification 
within NATO are caused in part by a difference in emphasis regarding the 
nature of the Soviet threat. The contrast between the French ax;td American 
opinion may be expressed thusly: .American opinion tends to emphasize 
48Lester B. Pearson, "Ten Years of NATO,"~ Letter, Vol. 7, No. 10 
(:May, 1959), pp. 4-5, 
49Paul-Henri Spaa};:, "The Poli ti cal Future of NATO, 11 NATO Letter, 
Vol. 7, No. 12 (December, 1959), p, 4, Publication of an address given 
by Secretary General Spaak to the British Imperial Defense College, 
London, November 2, 1959, 
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the military aspect of the alliance because it fears an attack by Soviet 
forces; whereas, French opinion is convinced that the essential battle 
between the two worlds is conducted with political, economic and psycho-
logical weapons. This is a crude generalization, Differences in inter-
pretation regarding the world situation and the Soviet menace are found 
within every nation and within every party. It is probably that the 
differences between European and American statesmen on this question are 
only a difference i n degree. At the present time American leaders are 
incli ned to point out that military preparations are as indispensable 
today as yesterday, European leaders are inclined to take the opposite 
view. Perhaps this is because Americans are more preoccupied with 
military defense since they have the duty and means to provide it. The 
Europeans are less preoccupied with it because they have fewer resources 
and because they judge that their contirubtions can be more effective 
in other ways,5° · 
Even more important than the alternatives of military preparation 
or economic competition are the relationships between the countries of 
the North Atlantic Alliance and those countries which belong to neither 
the Western conununity nor the Soviet bloc of states. There is no 
disagreement on the necessity of keeping the peoples of Asia, the Near 
East and Africa outside the Soviet orbit; however, agreement on methods 
for maintaining freedom is not easily reached by the members of NATO, 
As has been frequently pointed out, American opinion remains generally 
faithful to the anti-colonialist tradition, American feeling that the 
50Raymond Aron and August Heckscher, Diversitl £!_~World (New 
York, 1957) contains an excellent analysis of the differences between 
the United States and the French (European) points of view regarding 
the Soviet Union and nationalism in colonial areas, 
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movement of coloni al populations toward independence is inevitable believe 
that i t is better to support and guide this movement so that these future 
states will not abandon the West. The French, though not unanimous on 
this subject (as witnessed by t he various points of view regarding the 
Algerian independence movement), reject American anti-colonial declarations 
by po:!.ntmg out that the United States has not solved its own racial problems 
satisfactorily.51 
One explanation of the difference i n outlook between America on 
t he one hand, anc Fr ance and Great Britain on the other, and an expl anat ion 
f r equently accepted by Europe~ns opposed t o Junerican policies, ie based 
on the i nternational rivalr y f or economic power,52 The desire on t he 
part of Americans to remove t he Fr ench presence in North Africa. ie based, 
accordi ng t ot ls point of view, by a desire to see American business 
i nterests in North Af rica advanced. The economic importance of North 
Africa to France is a matter of the gravest concern to the future of 
France . The r e sources, markets and population of North Afri~a are 
essential to mai ntain French status and standard of living . France has 
i nvested heavily in its empire and feels t hat this investment is not 
only for itself but ultimately for the entir e North Atlantic Alliance , 
The French point out that the Americans can afford to be idealistic 
and urge the gift of f r eedom since t he United States faces no economic 
loss, but r ather stands to gai n by such change. 
51~., pp. 83-86. 
52rn t he debate in the House of Commons over the Marspall plan con-
sider able issue was made over American economic imperialism, S~e, 
"Parliamentary Debates , " (Hansard), House 2.£ Commons Ott1~ Refort, 3rd 
Session 2!, the Thirtl-ci~th Parliament of the United Kin~dom o oi:,e~t 
Britain and"lforthern-Xre~nd, Vol, 453, ~ h~ries, cola. 216~~8. " 
Also see-:;--rurniss, 9.£• _ill,, p, 307 , 
As seen from the above discussion, the differences among the United 
States and the members of NATO which have colonial interests are 
difficult to resolve. Americans are naturally reluctant to be drawn into 
a union that would bind them to sharing the commitments, for example, 
of France to North Africa. The French, on the other hand, wonder how any 
satisfactory partnership could exist if the things that the French regard 
as essential are not respected. Probably this lack of American support 
on French colonial issues more than anything else has driven a wedge 
between these two NATO countries over the past few years.53 
While the lack of identity of interest and foreign policy of the 
NATO nations - as witnessed -:~- ,.::ontroversies over Cy;prus, Suez and North 
Africa - has placed difficulti63 in the way of an Atlantic union move-
ment, there is evidence of increased political consultation and efforts 
to coordinate NATO policy in matters concerning negotiations with the 
Soviet Union.54 The North Atlantic Council meets frequently, and in 
spite of a tendency to settle problems among the larger states to the 
annoyance of smaller states who feel they have an equal interest although 
sharing less responsibility, there has been a remarkable unity on many 
problems.55 There are, of course, divergent positions at which time the 
press discusses the current crisis in NATO. But some disagreement is 
surely to be expected, particularly on matters of procedure.56 
53see, Free,~· cit., pp. 87, 89, 95-101; also see, The New York 
Times, March 22, 1959, p. E 5, 
54 
Pearson,~· cit., p. 5, 
55The New York Times, November 15, 1959, p. E 5. 
56spaak, op. cit., p. 4. 
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To NATO Secretary General Spaak the most essential need during the 
coming years is the coordination of Western economic policy. This is 
necessary because in the communist states all economic forces are at the 
disposal of poli.tical objectives and among non-communist states competition 
within the state and among states still remains the general rule. It is, 
according to Spaak, far easier to mobilize and coordinate military 
forces than to create the common economic policy that is essential for 
the economic struggle of co-existence with the Soviet Union.57 NATO's 
ambition to be an economic organization appears, however, to have been 
pre-empted by the creation of the economic trading groups. 
In the economic field, X is both too large and not large enough 
for the development of special trade and economic arrangements among its 
members. The first economic grouping lies entirely within the North 
Atlantic organization. It is the Europe of the Six comprised of approxi-
mately 160 million people of France, Western Germany, Italy,- Belgiillll, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg whose governments have experimented since 
1950 with supernational institutions in the form of the well-established 
European Coal and Steel Comrnu.~ity, the unfulfilled European Defense and 
Political Community plans, the new common market (European Economic 
Connnunity) and the European Community for Atomic Energy.58 As seen by the 
number of common organizations, the six-nation grouping appears to be 
both natural and successful, It is, however, with regard to the common 
market that a split has developed which threatens the cohesion of NATO. 
57Ibid., p. 6. 
58M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York, 
19 59 ) , p • 28 3 • 
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The common market bas within it potentially bad economic consequences 
for the other states of Europe, These states, which include Austria, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Great Britain have 
established a seven-nation European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven) 
with the ultimate objective of building a Europe-wide trading community 
to include the common market,59 Instead of the eventual adoption of a 
single free-trading system, many experts see the danger of a permanent 
economic split which, tf true, will divide NATO into two economic groups,60 
One solution proposed by Dean Acheson is to supersede NATO with a new 
association that would determine European economic and political policy. 
This grouping of states would include the fifteen members of NATO as well 
as countries from outside the alliance such as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain 
and Austria. 61 
Regardless of what has not been accomplished, the desire for unifi-
cation continues. Some see the solution in the creation of Western 
Europe as a political, economic and military unit which would work in 
close cooperation with Canada and the United States.62 Others urge the 
closer association, if not federation, of the Atlantic democracies. 
There is no denying either the reality of the movement for European unity 
or the reality of the Atlantic community. The two are not mutually 
exclusive. This position was reaffirmed in a report of NATO's Committee 
of Three in December, 1956, which states that the evolution of the Atlantic 
59The New York Times, November 22, 1959, p. 42. 
60ibid., Quoting from The Financial Times of London. 
6libid., October 4, 1959, pp. l, 3. 
62see, Moore, op. cit., for a reference favoring European Union. 
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community through NATO should not prevent the formation of even closer 
relationships among some of its members. The move toward European unity 
and Atlantic cooperation, the report continued, should be "parallel and 
complementary, not competitive or conflicting, 11 63 
Although NATO itself has not proven to be a vehicle for political 
and economic integration within the North Atlantic community, it has 
:provided an organization for coordination and planning, Representatives 
of the fifteen NATO nd.t:l.ons meet regularly to discuss common problems. 
It is entirely reasonable to assume that, through NATO, agreement can be 
reached concerning European economic integration. If so, the leadership 
of the United States will pi'-: . be necessary, As one of the most 
dispassionate of the NATO diploms.ts said recently, "We cannot surmount 
our European difficulties and differences without a strong lead from 
Washington. You alone have the detachment from intramural quarrels to 
arbitrate them. 1164 
63"Report of the CorrJni ttee of Thre on Non-military Co-operation in · 
NATO," NATO, Information Division, (Paris, December 14, 1956), para. 40 
as quot'e'clin Ball, op. cit., p. 426. 
64The ~~Times, December 13, 1959, p. E 5, 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS ./\:ND PROSPECTS 
Conclusions 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been successful in 
preventing even the smallest gain by the Soviet Union on territory 
covered by the Atlantic Pact. This result has been achieved without 
recourse to force. The danger of Russian aggression, however, con-
tinues to exist though the nature of the threat is more complex than 
when the North Atlantic Alliance was organized over eleven years ago. 
The need and desire for security, therefore, continues to be one of 
the strongest motivating forces of the connnunity of interests that 
brought the fifteen NATO nations together. 
This thesis began with the major hypothesis that in order for the 
NATO alliance to be effective, it must be acceptable to its members. 
If, therefore, the United States is to continue to depend upon NATO for 
defense, the United States will have to make its foreign policies 
acceptable to the other members of the alliance. It is concluded as 
a result of this study that 1n some respects American policies are not 
sufficiently adaptable to obtain the full support and concert of 
effort among the European mern.bers of NATO. 'l'he result has been to 
decrease the effectiveness of the alliance. 
In the introductory chapter a nUJnber of sub-hypotheses were set 
forth. My conclusions regarding these sub-hypotheses are as follows: 
1, The factors that lead to the creation of NATO in the first 
78 
79 
place are no longer completely tenable with the result that the alliance 
has been weakened. This is due to the fact that: 
a. The economic recovery of Western Europe from the results 
of World War II has been attaj_ned. 
b. The stability of West European governments has been 
improved. The danger of overthrowing established governmental institu-. 
tions through indirect aggression at the hands of communist minorities 
has lessened. This is due to improvement in the standard of living 
which has made the communist ideology less attractive and to the 
improvement of security against overt attack. 
c. The Russian three:t has changed so as to place greater 
emphasis on other areas, such as Asia and Africa where the provisions 
of the North Atlantic Treaty do not apply, 
2. The concepts of military strategy that applied when NATO was 
organized and for five or six years thereafter have been outmoded due 
to rapid developments in Russian military technology. These concepts, 
based to a large extent upon American doctrine, are: 
a. The almost exclusive reliance upon nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent and defense both against the threat of a general war and the 
threat of a limited war. 
b. The reliance upon the United States and to a lesser 
extent Great Britain in the use of their nuclear weapons monopoly for 
the protection of the other NATO states against aggression short of 
general war. 
3, The North Atlantic Alliance is threatened by diverse political 
forces and interests in the member states whi.ch have tended to detract 
from the over-all success of the alliance. This study has discussed 
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three such threats: 
a. The various proposals for the alteration of military and 
political arrangements in Central Europe which are described by the 
term "disengagement". 
b. The efforts of France to attain hegemony both within 
and outside NATO. 
c. The tendency of some members of NATO to rega;rd others as 
either unequal or untrustworthy. 
4. The North Atlantic Alliance has not as yet justified the hope 
that it would prove adaptable to the unification of either the politica:J_ 
or economic institutions of ite :nembers although this hope continues to 
exist. Indirectly, however, NATO has proved to have a cohesive effect, 
among the member states as evidenced by: 
a. The considerable amount of political cooperation and 
coordination that has been attained in matters regarding the relation-
ship of NATO countries with the Soviet Union. 
b. The considerable amount of economic integration that has 
taken place in Western Europe outside of NATO, 
Prospects 
The future of the North Atlantic Alliance depends upon the assump-
tion that national differences existing among its members will continue 
to be outweighed by the community of interests they share in the 
furtherance of free institutions and in the value of mutual :;;ecurity. 
I believe that this assumption is sound. 
It appears inevitable in the absence of general atoniic disarmament 
that the forces of the European members of NATO must become equipped with 
nuclear weapons either; 1) through their own efforts, individually or 
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collectively, or 2) through the assistance of the United States. It 
is evident that nuclear weapons could be supplied more effectively by 
the .NATO nations already producing them, In my opin:fon the Unitec1 
States must offer nuclear weapons to its NATO allies. Such an act 
would strengthen NATO, boost the confidence of Western Europeans in 
their capacity to resist Soviet threats, minimize the expense of weapons 
development and facilitate a weapons control system in which the United 
States could part:icipa:te more e:f'f'ecti vely. 
If NATO is to continue to provid.e security :t'or all its members, 
there must be a greater understanding by the United States that the 
military threat posed by the :}.,vlet bloc cannot be deterred without both 
nuclear weapons and strong con·v,mtional forces. The more successful 
the free worlcl :i.s in preventing a gene:i:·al we~r, the more likely the 
Soviet Union will continue to advance in ways that will avoid presenting 
the United States and its allies with an issue so clear and direct that 
a massive nuclear response could be employed. If the United States 
desires its Eu.ropean allies to have the will to· defend themselves, the 
military strategy of the United States must clearly support the possi-
bility of non-atomic and localized response when such action is appropriate. 
The present American policies in regard to the sharing of nuclear 
weapons and the role of conventiaonal forces have, :l.n my opinion, little 
to recommend them. With the increased knowledge of the American public 
that in the event of a general war it would. suffer millions of casualties 
as well as a paralyzing economic blow, it is believed that there will 
be a greater interest in a military strategy that offers an increased 
opportunity for limiting war; In add.itfon, defense policies have received 
the inc:i:•eased scrutiny of Congress during recent months. It is, therefore, 
quite possible that present military and nuclear policies will be 
modified with resulting benefits to NATO. 
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If NATO is to continue to prosper, there must be an expansion of 
its operations to provide a common approach to the military, political 
and economic problems of Asia and Africa. Restricting the area of 
NATO's operations to Europe does not make maximum use of the resources 
of the alliance to me'et the threat of a potential enemy with global 
interests and activities. The limiting l)y NATO members of their freedom 
of action outside the alliance area, however, may prove to be one of the 
most difficult problems ~o solve. 
For the immediate future 2,t least, the primary objective of NATO 
must be to provide military security to its members. Ultimately, however, 
the adaptability and effectiveness of NATO w:i.11 depend upon the unifica-
tion of economic and political institutions of its members. Such 
unification could be either within NATO or outside of NATO. The 'important 
thing is that NATO continues to act as a st,imulus to integration, for only 
in this way will the forces of nationalism and self-interest that tend to 
weaken the free world be countered effectively. 
There is, in spite of the difficulties that lie ahead for the NATO 
nations, much to be found on the credit side of the ledger. An alliance 
has been created which has contributed to the prevention of Soviet 
aggression against its members. Economic recovery from World War II 
has been accomplished and the people of Europe are more prosperous 
than ever before. In general, the demands of the fm:mer colonial peoples 
for independence have been met peacefu_lly. There is, in the light of 
what has been accomplished, every reeson to be optimistic that present 
and future problems can and will be solved successfully by the nations 
comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
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